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Summary
As the drought in western states worsens, the agri-
cultural sector is being criticized for failing to adopt 
technical responses, such as shifting to less water-
demanding crops and state-of-the-art irrigation 
systems . However, these responses alone are insuf-
ficient to reduce water consumption if unaccompa-
nied by changes in how the law defines and allocates 
water rights . This Article proposes a redefinition of 
water rights to ensure that changes in crops or irri-
gation techniques are socially efficient . It proposes 
“prior consumption” as an additional measure of water 
rights in prior appropriation regimes, one that more 
accurately reflects the true social cost of agricultural 
water use . This would prevent farmers from taking 
advantage of technical responses to increase their water 
use and would protect downstream users and the envi-
ronment . In addition, water markets would benefit, 
since water rights would be better defined and the 
review process of water market transactions would be 
streamlined . The proposal is consistent with the under-
lying principles of prior appropriation, and would sur-
vive a potential takings challenge .
As of 2016, California is facing the fifth year of a seri-ous drought . Other western states already suffer or are likely to suffer from similar scarcity in the near 
future due to climate change . As the largest water user, the 
agricultural sector1 is widely criticized for misusing irriga-
tion water by employing inefficient irrigation methods and 
growing water-intensive crops . The critique even made a 
New York Times Sunday editorial .2
As a response to the scarcity crisis, it is often argued 
that the agricultural sector should be more efficient, for 
instance, by adopting so-called efficient irrigation sys-
tems . Sprinklers and drip irrigation, which have little to 
no return flows, are thus expected to solve our water woes 
by ensuring that the agricultural sector conserves water for 
other users .3 However, this is not the case . Experts have 
proven that technically efficient irrigation systems may 
end up consuming more water than traditional irrigation 
methods .4 This is because flood or furrow irrigation meth-
1 . In California, agricultural use amounts to 80% of the water consumed, 
while its contribution to the state’s gross domestic product is 2% .
2 . Watering California’s Farms, N .Y . Times, Apr . 4, 2015 .
3 . Conservation is not a univocal concept . In this Article, it is used to mean 
making more water available to others . However, A . Dan Tarlock notes that 
“in this century [the 20th century] ‘conservation’ has been defined either 
as maximizing the use of water by augmenting the supply or as an efficient 
engineering method of using less water to achieve the objective .” A . Dan 
Tarlock, The Changing Meaning of Water Conservation in the West, 66 Neb . 
L . Rev . 145, 147 (1987) .
4 . Frank Ward & Manuel Pulido-Velázquez, Water Conservation in Irrigation 
Can Increase Water Use, 105 PNAS 18215 (2008); Ray Huffaker & Norman 
Whittlesey, The Allocative Efficiency and Conservation Potential of Water 
Laws Encouraging Investments in On-Farm Irrigation Technology, 24 Agric . 
Econ . 47 (2000); Brian Venn et al ., Hydrologic Impacts Due to Changes in 
Conveyance and Conversion From Flood to Sprinkler Irrigation Practices, 130 
J . Irrigation & Drainage Engineering 192 (2004); Aurélien Dumont 
et al ., Is the Rebound Effect or Jevons Paradox a Useful Concept for Better 
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ods do not consume all water diverted: a large part of it 
goes back to the river via return flow . With drip irriga-
tion, this is not the case: plants consume almost all of the 
water and there is no return flow . Thus, once some farmers 
adopt technically efficient irrigation methods, other users, 
including the environment, who were relying on the return 
flow can no longer use that water and streamflow down-
stream is reduced .5
Adopting efficient irrigation systems does not achieve 
the goal pursued by conservation policies of saving water 
for other users . Policies advocating for technological solu-
tions without taking into account this “rebound effect” are 
misleading . Given how overallocated streams are, the extra 
water consumed using drip irrigation is water that some 
other user had been relying on for decades . The adoption of 
drip irrigation or sprinklers may translate into water being 
in fewer hands . The U .S . Supreme Court case Montana v. 
Wyoming6 illustrates this point: the Yellowstone River that 
these two states share had less water than it did in 1950 
when they signed the compact . In the 2000s, there was 
not enough water flowing to Montana because Wyoming 
farmers adopted sprinkler irrigation systems and consumed 
more than before .
Drip irrigation and sprinkler systems are labeled effi-
cient because they increase the yield at the plot installed 
or lose less water to evaporation or return flow . However, 
the desirability of their adoption should be analyzed on 
the basis of their positive effect on the overall water use 
value . If some farmers adopt drip or sprinklers and increase 
their yields, but other farmers are no longer able to produce 
because they are deprived of the return flow, the change in 
the overall allocation is not a Pareto-efficient improvement . 
Not only may the adoption of technically efficient irriga-
tion systems be unfair to users who have been relying on 
return flows, it may also be inefficient .
The burden should be on proponents of new tech-
nologies to prove that the aggregate outcome constitutes 
an improvement (or, in other words, is Kaldor-Hicks-
efficient even if not Pareto-efficient); that is, that their 
increased profits could hypothetically offset the losses 
imposed on users who can no longer irrigate . But this is 
Management of Water Resources? Insights From the Irrigation Modernisation 
Process in Spain, 1 Aquatic Procedia 64 (2013); Julio Berbel et al ., 
Literature Review on Rebound Effect of Water Saving Measures and Analysis of 
a Spanish Case Study, 29 Water Res . Mgmt . 663 (2014) .
5 . Technical Work Group for the Interagency Task Force on 
Irrigation Efficiencies, Irrigation Water Use, and Management, at 
Glossary 1-5 (June 1978 review draft), cited in George W . Pring & Karen 
A . Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriers to Conservation and Efficient Use of 
Water in the West, 25 Rocky Mtn . Min . L . Inst . 4 (1979) (“It is estimated 
that return flow amounts to 92 million acre feet annually as compared 
to the 79 million acre feet consumed by crops each year . Return flow is 
commonly utilized downstream but it carries the problems of erosion and 
water quality degradation .”) .
6 . 131 S . Ct . 1765, 179 L . Ed . 2d 799, 41 ELR 20168 (2011) .
not what prior appropriation, the regime that allocates 
water in the West, establishes: as the Supreme Court 
stated in the aforementioned interstate compact dispute, 
farmers are allowed to change irrigation methods even if 
their consumption goes up .
The notion that conservation strategies may backfire is 
not new . However, the scholarship on water law has rarely 
considered this possibility . The discussion in the energy-
efficiency world has been heated for a long time . Fuel-
efficient cars may induce driving more miles because of 
cheaper fuel, increasing overall emissions compared with 
less-efficient cars . Efficient appliances may save less energy 
than we expect because the amount a consumer saves in 
her energy bill is spent on other goods in her basket that 
consume energy . This is known as the rebound effect . The 
increase in consumption when changing irrigation meth-
ods can be considered an extreme example of the rebound 
effect . Users will increase how much they drive, but rarely 
will drive twice as much . But with water-efficiency mea-
sures farmers, particularly in water-short basins, are likely 
to consume as much as possible if this allows them to 
increase production .
An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
report calls for taking into consideration the potential 
rebound effect when calculating energy savings . Likewise, 
water regulation should not accept at face value that tech-
nologically efficient measures produce real water savings 
and bring our water allocation closer to efficiency . Prior 
appropriation needs to account for this rebound effect . 
Prior appropriation defines water rights according to the 
volume diverted and, thus, it allows farmers to consume as 
much as they have the right to divert . Accordingly, when 
adopting technically efficient irrigation systems, they can 
consume more water than they were consuming previously .
Hence, prior appropriation does not ensure that when 
changes in consumption happen, the new allocation is 
equal or more efficient than the status quo . Even more, as 
shall be seen, it encourages farmers to consume as much as 
possible because those farmers may fear losing their rights 
due to non-use . This is why I propose including an addi-
tional variable—historical consumption—in the defini-
tion of prior appropriation water rights; users will be able 
to consume only what they have been consuming histori-
cally, thus preventing the rebound effect . Introducing con-
sumption as a limit allows farmers to change the irrigation 
method if it is Pareto-efficient to do so; the farmer adopt-
ing drip irrigation increases her profits and the rest of the 
users are not harmed . But as I explain, this proposal would 
also facilitate the purchase of water from those less efficient 
by those who need to increase the amount consumed once 
they install a different irrigation system .
Copyright © 2016 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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The above proposal addresses not only irrigation effi-
ciency, but also other choices that farmers make that may 
affect water consumption . This is particularly the case for 
crop choice . Farmers are free to choose which crop they 
may grow . Their choices are often highly influenced by fed-
eral and state subsidies . Alfalfa production in California’s 
Central Valley has been the focus of critiques for many 
years because it is a low-value crop that consumes a lot of 
subsidized water .7
Today, many critics focus on the high levels of water 
required to grow almonds, a crop increasingly adopted 
by California growers even in the midst of the current 
water crisis . Almonds are profitable because their market 
price is high, but almond trees require more water than 
the crops previously grown in the same area . In addition, 
they introduce inflexibility in the water management 
system; almond trees cannot be fallowed in the event of 
a crisis . If farmers were restricted to consume the same 
amount they have been consuming historically, their 
choice of crops would be limited . They could change and 
grow almond trees, but if the nuts require more water 
than a previous crop, farmers would plant fewer acres or 
buy extra water .
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I describes the 
choices that farmers have and the potential impacts on 
water distribution and efficiency . Section II analyzes how 
those changes are treated under prior appropriation law . 
Section III describes different regulatory options to deal 
with the effects of farmers’ choices in water use, proposes 
using consumptive use as a measure of water rights, and 
analyzes the strengths and challenges of such a proposal, 
mainly the measurement difficulty and the potential tak-
ings challenges . Section IV concludes .
I. Irrigation Efficiency: Effects
A. Farmers’ Choices
Farmers have many choices when trying to make the most 
of their water, which, individually, means obtaining the 
maximum amount of profit per drop . First, they may 
improve current systems, both of irrigation and of water 
conveyance . They can level their fields when using flood 
irrigation, allowing a more even distribution of water, or 
adopt optimal irrigation schedules catering to the plants’ 
needs . Farmers may also reduce transfer losses; they may 
improve the conveyance system from the river or stream 
from where they take their water to their field . But as the 
water savings achieved by lining the All-American Canal 
show, those changes are not necessarily a Pareto improve-
ment . As a result of the canal lining, farmers in Mexico 
did not have enough groundwater to irrigate . It inhibited 
water seeping, which recharged the aquifers on the other 
side of the frontier . Conveyance infrastructure improve-
7 . Justin Fox, Why California Needs Thirsty Alfalfa, Bloomberg, May 26, 2015,
http://www .bloombergview .com/articles/2015-05-26/why-they-grow- 
thirsty-alfalfa-in-parched-california .
ments pursued by irrigation districts could result in simi-
lar outcomes .
Second, farmers may change the type of crop they are 
growing . Water consumption varies depending on the crop . 
Farmers maximize their revenues . The amount of water 
they are legally entitled to and that is available to them 
may be a constraint if the volume is lower than some crops 
require . Provided they have enough water, farmers will 
grow the crop that brings them more profits, once other 
variable costs are taken into account . Depending on the 
state where the farmer resides, these choices are sometimes 
distorted because farmers not only get the market price for 
their harvest, but also some federal or state subsidies .
Third, farmers can shift to more technically efficient 
irrigation methods . Changing to sprinklers or drip irriga-
tion entails high upfront fixed costs .8 Such an investment 
will not always be profitable . It will depend on the type of 
soil, the water available to farmers, and the crop farmers 
want to grow . Federal and state governments have given 
incentives to farmers to shift irrigation systems based on 
the idea that they will conserve water . These incentives take 
two forms: direct funding of those mechanisms, or grant 
farmers title to the amount of water they save . Granting 
title to the amount of water conserved implies that farm-
ers can sell that water .9 The statutes that grant the farmer 
rights to the water conserved by changing the irrigation 
method or taking other measures have, to a great extent, 
acknowledged the rebound effect described in the intro-
duction . These statutes only grant title to the amount of 
water really conserved; the shift in irrigation systems can-
not cause an increase in consumption .
However, there are programs at the state and federal 
levels that fund technically efficient irrigation methods 
but do not consider the potential effects of changing those 
methods . Also, farmers may decide to change the meth-
ods just because it is economically sensible for them to do 
so even if systemically it has deleterious effects . The man-
agement of drip irrigation implies less labor costs while 
producing a higher yield . For the water system, drip irri-
gation ensures that pesticides and fertilizers are not car-
ried back to the river via return flows . Hence, nonpoint 
source pollution is reduced .
The type of crop also influences the choice of irriga-
tion method . In general, field crops like alfalfa are usually 
less amenable to drip irrigation than garden crops such as 
vegetables . Drip irrigation is also not advisable in areas 
where water contains high levels of salinity because salt 
can build up on the field . Similarly, if surface water sup-
ply is not continuous, drip irrigation may not work as well 
as it does when the source is groundwater because with 
8 . It is estimated that drip irrigation requires an investment between $800 
and $1,200 per acre . Ari Michelsen et al ., Evaluation of Irrigation 
Efficiency Strategies for Far West Texas: Feasibility, Water Savings, 
and Cost Considerations 52 (2009) .
9 . Such provisions need to ensure that farmers do not fear the forfeiture of 
their rights . In prior appropriation, unused rights can be forfeited by the 
water agency . For a discussion of forfeiture and the incentives arising from 
that institution, see infra note 45 and accompanying text .
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Sea, a saline lake created by that runoff . In this case, reduc-
ing runoff to the Salton Sea would not necessarily generate 
a negative outcome; however, the surrounding ecosystem 
has grown dependent on the existence of this salty lake, 
and excessive reductions in runoff could threaten the fish 
and wildlife now reliant on agricultural runoff .12 Still, in 
water-abundant areas, return flows may not have been 
appropriated yet . Thus, the increase in consumption may 
not affect other consumptive uses because there is enough 
water to satisfy them . Environmental flows will be none-
theless reduced but perhaps not to levels that threaten the 
survival of species . Those water-abundant areas are less and 
less common in the West . Overappropriation is the norm .13
1. Flood Irrigation
The first scenario (Scenario 1) is the situation before any 
improvement in the irrigation system has been made . Two 
farmers are using flood irrigation, a low-tech method where 
the farmer, using gravity or pumps, diverts water out of the 
stream and covers the whole field with water . From that 
water, the amount of water lost to the river is the amount 
evaporated and the amount consumed by the plants . Plants 
receive part of the water . However, because the water does 
not target the plants, part of it evaporates and/or is irre-
trievably lost from the basin as it seeps and becomes unre-
coverable groundwater .14 The rest of the water goes back to 
the river or recharges the aquifers .
Flood irrigation is a cheaper method in terms of capital 
investment but, depending on the scale of the agricultural 
production, may incur more variable costs, such as fertil-
izers and labor, than other irrigation methods . A system 
similar to flood irrigation is furrow . Furrow irrigation also 
uses gravity to move water around the field, but instead of 
flooding the whole acreage, water gets channeled by dirt 
furrows . Flood and furrow have lower yields than other 
irrigation methods because water does not reach plants in 
the optimal places or at the optimal times .
Farmer A grows alfalfa, a crop that is often blamed for 
consuming a lot of water, and is common, for example, in 
California’s Imperial Valley,15 a former desert .16 The river, 
as it reaches farmer A’s plot, has available 8 .5 acre-feet (ac-
ft) . Farmer A has a right to use 5 ac-ft, and in Scenario 1 she 
diverts that amount to irrigate her crop . Her production of 
12 . Sue McClurg, The Salton Sea: The Environmental and Economic Values of This 
Vast Inland Lake Prompt Local Officials to Launch a New Restoration Effort, 
Water Educ . Found . (Mar ./Apr . 1994), available at http://www .sci .sdsu .
edu/salton/EnvirnEconValueSaltonSea .html .
13 . Gregory J . Hobbs Jr ., Beneficial Use & Anti-Speculation, Can These Water 
Law Principles Meet the Challenges of Climate Change?, 137 Water Rep . 1 
(2015) .
14 . The extracted water ends up as: (1) beneficial evapotranspiration, which is 
the part that the plant consumes; (2) non-beneficial evapotranspiration, that 
is, evaporation; and (3) nonrecoverable runoff or percolation . Charles M . 
Burt et al ., Irrigation Performance Measures: Efficiency and Uniformity, 123 J . 
Irrigation & Drainage Engineering 423 (1997) .
15 . Imperial Irrigation District, Annual Inventory of Areas Receiving 
Water: Years 2013, 2012, 2011, available at http://www .iid .com/home/
showdocument?id=9071 .
16 . Harry T . Cory & William P . Blake, The Imperial Valley and the 
Salton Sink 24 (1915) .
the latter, the farmer can dictate when her demand will 
be satisfied . In sum, it is a factual inquiry whether adopt-
ing technically efficient irrigation methods is more ben-
eficial than costly, but the assumption that it is always an 
improvement is a mistake .
B. Example
The following example and figures describe how a shift in 
irrigation methods changes the flow, yield, and water avail-
able for other users and the environment .10 For simplicity 
purposes, I assume that rights are only defined by volume, 
not by flow per unit of time as they normally are in prior 
appropriation states . I illustrate the change from flood 
irrigation to drip irrigation . The results could be similar if 
instead of drip, a farmer adopts microspray, which is a type 
of sprinkler . Traditional sprinklers are also an improve-
ment over flood or furrow irrigation, and may consume 
more water . Not all methods are suited to all environ-
ments . For example, center pivot sprinklers may not be 
suited to windy environments because the water may be 
carried away before it reaches the soil . Similarly, drip irri-
gation may be problematic for areas where water is saline, 
requiring extra management .
The effects may be similar whenever there is a change in 
irrigation management that increases the amount of water 
consumed . Lining the canals should not increase con-
sumption per se but it may change where water returns to 
the basin; before lining the canals, water used to percolate, 
but after, it may reenter as return flow . Changing the crop 
grown may also translate to increased water consumption .
The situation portrayed here illustrates what happens in 
areas like the Lower Rio Grande or Colorado’s Big Thomp-
son project, where irrigators rely on others’ return flows . 
In water-short scenarios, drip irrigation tends to consume 
more than flood irrigation if the user is not receiving the 
full amount of water that she needs . This is a likely situa-
tion in many western states where scarcity has dictated that 
very few farmers receive their full allotments every year . In 
a water-scarce scenario, it is likely that fewer users will be 
able to use water once efficient irrigation systems have been 
installed .11 As mentioned, pollution will be reduced if drip 
is installed, but pollution is also more concentrated the less 
water there is .
However, in other situations, return flows are not being 
reused . For example, in the Imperial and Coachella Val-
leys, runoff from agricultural producers flows to the Salton 
10 . Most of the data (crop yield, evapotranspiration, and crop price) is taken 
from Frank Ward & Manuel Pulido-Velázquez’s study in the Lower Rio 
Grande Basin, one of the studies that looks holistically at the effects 
of shifting to technically efficient irrigation methods . Ward & Pulido-
Velázquez, supra note 4 .
11 . Scholars exploring the shift from flood irrigation to center pivot sprinklers 
have shown that the more water-short the scenario, the more consumption 
goes up when changing irrigation methods (from flood to sprinklers in 
their case) even though the acreage is lower when applying center pivot . 
Daniel M . O’Brien et al ., Economics of Surface to Sprinkler Irrigation System 
Conversion for Lower Capacity Systems, Kan . St . U ., http://www .k-state .edu/
irrigate/reports/irrext2k .pdf .
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Scenario 3 presents exactly the same situation as Sce-
nario 2, except farmer B also installs drip irrigation . It may 
be thought that farmer A’s change of irrigation method 
will give farmer B the proper incentive to do so . However, 
as the example shows, drip also increases farmer B’s con-
sumption, and thus there may be less water available for 
instream flows and other users downstream of farmer B . 
There is no way to know ex ante whether those users that 
now cannot irrigate would have produced more or less than 
the increase in farmers A and B’s production resulting from 
the irrigation system change .
In Scenario 2, it is clear that the shift in irrigation sys-
tems by farmer A is not a Pareto improvement .18 Whether 
it could be Kaldor-Hicks-efficient will depend on whether 
the increase in farmer A’s benefits due to increased yield, 
minus the capital investment in drip irrigation, is enough 
to offset not only farmer B’s losses, but also those of fur-
ther downstream users and the environment . Drip also has 
social benefits in the form of reduced nonpoint source pol-
lution . However, there are regulations addressing nonpoint 
source pollution and, assuming those are enforced, if drip 
is the most efficient method to comply with them, farmers 
will change the irrigation method accordingly . Hence, if 
anything, pollution abatement may provide further incen-
tives for farmers to adopt drip irrigation no matter how the 
volume of the right is calculated .
Proponents lauding the technical efficiency of drip irri-
gation do not fully consider whether water is being used in 
the most socially efficient way, which is what our policies 
prescribing or encouraging the shift to drip or sprinklers 
aim to achieve . In fact, it may well be that water, like many 
other assets, has decreasing marginal returns . This means 
that the extra water consumed by farmer A in Scenario 2 
may produce less return than the same water being used by 
farmer B who could not irrigate otherwise . In other words, 
the increased revenue of the farmer whose consumption 
grows is not enough to offset the decrease in revenue of the 
farmer who now cannot irrigate at all .19
In sum, individually efficient irrigation systems are not 
equivalent to systemic efficiency . Also, if the measure of 
success were food production, the shift in irrigation meth-
ods only tells us that farmer A will produce more, but it 
does not tell much about the effects on overall agricultural 
production . The status quo may not be efficient, but a 
shift toward technically efficient irrigation methods does 
not unequivocally bring about a better situation systemi-
cally, even if some farmers produce more and pollute less, 
18 . For a review of the concepts of technical and allocative efficiency and how 
legal scholarship has used them, see Lewis A . Kornhauser, A Guide to the 
Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 Hofstra L . Rev . 591 (1980) .
19 . Deficit irrigation exposes the crop to a certain level of water stress . Sam 
Geerts & Rick Gaes, Deficit Irrigation as an On-Farm Strategy to Maximize 
Crop Water Productivity in Dry Areas, 96 Agric . Water Mgmt . 1275 
(2009) . Their analysis confirms that deficit irrigation can stabilize crop 
yields, not maximize them, provided there is some moisture . Some crops 
are better-suited to this than others, for example sugar beets and sunflowers . 
See Cevat Kirda, Deficit Irrigation Scheduling Based on Plant Growth Stages 
Shoring Water Stress Tolerance, in Deficit Irrigation Practices (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2002) .
alfalfa amounts to 8 tons that she sells at a price of $130 
per ton . She has a return flow of 2 .8 ac-ft, which means 
that the stream between plot A and plot B has 6 .3 ac-ft 
available . The return flow can be used by other farmers and 
feed instream flows . For the purposes of the example, there 
are no groundwater effects . The evapotranspiration (ET) 
or the amount consumed (that is, depleted from the river) 
is 2 .2 ac-ft . Not all of the 2 .2 ac-ft of water is consumed 
by the plants .
Water that is not lost or wasted reenters the stream as 
return flow, available to downstream users and the overall 
ecosystem . In Scenario 1, farmer B produces pecans using 
flood irrigation . He relies on farmer A’s return flow because 
he needs to divert 6 ac-ft from the 6 .3 ac-ft available . His 
return flow is 3 .1 ac-ft and the stream carries downstream 
3 .4 ac-ft .
2. Adopting Drip Irrigation
In Scenario 2, farmer A decides to change her irrigation 
method and she shifts from flood to drip irrigation . Once 
she has installed drip irrigation, she diverts 2 .7 ac-ft (less 
diversion than Scenario 1), but she consumes all of it . There 
is no return flow . In the example, her yield has increased 
25%, so her revenues have also gone up: from $1,040 in 
Scenario 1 to $1,300 in Scenario 2 . Farmer A’s diversion is 
lower, but her consumption has increased, so there is less 
water available in the stream after her plot .
In Scenario 2, the stream does not carry enough water 
for farmer B if he keeps using the same irrigation method 
and depends on farmer A’s return flow to fulfill his needs . 
If farmer B cannot produce, the increase in revenues by 
farmer A is not enough to offset farmer B’s losses . He, 
of course, could use all of the water available (or all the 
water available minus the water needed in the stream to 
protect the ecosystem if there was a minimum stream-
flow imposed) and still produce . But his production will 
decrease assuming no change in irrigation methods . The 
river flow will also decrease .
Drip irrigation is normally considered a more “effi-
cient” irrigation method . It produces more crop per drop; 
that is, drip irrigation maximizes water productivity for 
that particular crop in a particular field . This efficiency, 
akin to technical efficiency,17 only refers to the particular 
farmer; it says nothing about the impact on allocative effi-
ciency, that is, on whether it is efficient at a systemic level . 
If the farmer decides to change the irrigation system, then 
drip irrigation must also be economically efficient for the 
individual farmer because it may bring her more profit, 
which will allow her to recover the investment . But it 
may not be efficient in terms of the overall value obtained 
with water if other users cannot irrigate as a result of the 
increase in consumption .
17 . For a discussion of the positions of welfarists and environmentalists 
advocating economic efficiency as a reaction to the technological efficiency 
embraced in the 20th century, see Tarlock, supra note 3, at 147 .
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because other farmers and the environment are likely to 
suffer from reduced water availability .
Scenarios 2 and 3 should not be problematic from an 
efficiency viewpoint if there were a perfectly functioning 
market for irrigation water . If that were the case, farmer A 
could sell the extra amount of water she is now consuming 
to farmer B if he valued it more because he could profit 
more from it than farmer A . Or farmer A could sell it to 
those who want to protect the environment . But such a 
market does not exist .20
20 . See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text . As Section III .C . will 
describe, the proposal this Article puts forward may make water markets 
more efficient by reducing transaction costs .
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Beyond this hypothetical example, there are several 
basinwide studies testing how technically efficient irriga-
tion methods affect water distribution and welfare .21 For 
example, Frank Ward and Manuel Pulido-Velázquez ana-
lyze the effects of subsidized efficient irrigation techniques 
in the Upper Rio Grande Basin in the United States, spe-
cifically the 89,000 acres served by the Elephant Butte Irri-
gation District .22 Their findings confirm that return flows 
are an important source of supply for downstream users .23 
Their study considers the benefits and costs to farmers 
from increased yield, surplus of urban consumers, and net 
ecological benefits of reduced pollution and reduced flow, 
taking into account the enjoyment of nature as well as the 
costs of preserving it . Their results show that the adoption 
of those technologies does not reduce water usage even if 
the farmers are diverting less . The environment suffers . In 
their study, even though the change is beneficial for farm-
ers as a group in the basin, it is not beneficial for the over-
all population .
Ward and Pulido-Velázquez provide their analysis on an 
aggregated basis, so it is not possible to analyze the harm 
imposed to some agricultural users . It is also not possible 
to identify whether farmers could increase yields to a prof-
itable volume when shifting irrigation systems without 
increasing consumption . Government subsidies, at both 
the federal and state levels, play an important role in shap-
ing the choices of the agricultural sector . As Section II .F . 
explains, existing public policy assumes that by encourag-
ing the agricultural sector to adopt innovative irrigation 
technologies, more water will be available for other users 
and the environment . This logic is flawed and oversimpli-
fies the reality of how more technically efficient irrigation 
systems function .
As Section II describes, the response that prior appropri-
ation gives to certain individual technically efficient mea-
sures is unsatisfactory . To avoid the potentially undesirable 
effects that could arise from an increase in consumption, 
this Article puts forward a proposal in Section III: adding 
consumption as a variable to the definition of water rights 
under prior appropriation . This proposal is not the only 
way to address some of the effects that arise from changing 
irrigation methods, as Section III .F . shows .
II. Current Regulation and Its Problems
A. Current Definition of Prior Appropriation Rights
Settlers of the states west of the 100th meridian under-
stood early on that sensible allocation of water was key for 
their societies to thrive . It did not take them long to learn 
that legal solutions developed on the East Coast would 
not provide much help . Riparianism, which confers upon 
those owning a land adjacent to a river a right to a rea-
sonable use of water, proved particularly ill-suited for the 
21 . See supra note 4 .
22 . Ward & Pulido-Velázquez, supra note 4 .
23 . Id . at 18219 .
West, where the most profitable uses, like mining or irri-
gated agriculture, occurred further from the streams . The 
shortcomings of riparianism paved the way for a shift to 
prior appropriation, under which rights to use water are 
acquired by diverting water and putting it to beneficial use . 
Prior appropriation’s original goal was producing as much 
as possible .
Charles Meyers summarizes the elements of prior 
appropriation in his 1971 report to the National Water 
Commission:
A property right in the use of water is created by diversion 
of the water from a stream (or lake) and its application to 
a beneficial use . Water can be used at any location  .  .  . In 
the event of a shortage of supply, water will be supplied up 
to a limit of the right in order of temporal priority: the last 
man to divert and make use of the stream is the first to 
have his supply cut off .24
Prior appropriation has remained the cornerstone of 
water law in the American West . Modern statutory systems 
have adopted the tenets of prior appropriation . The main 
difference between common-law prior appropriation and 
statutory prior appropriation is that under the latter, the 
user needs to apply for a right before a water agency and, 
thus, agencies have a tighter control over those rights .
The question of whether a farmer can increase her con-
sumption if she does not divert more water when shifting 
irrigation methods was addressed for the first time before 
a court in the interstate compact dispute between Mon-
tana and Wyoming . The 1951 Yellowstone River Compact 
grandfathered pre-1950 water use rights in both Montana 
and Wyoming, giving those rights the highest priority . 
Wyoming appropriators, the upstream users, consumed 
more water as a result of adopting sprinklers as an irrigation 
method, and there was not enough water for Montana’s pre-
1950 appropriators . Montana argued that such an increase 
in consumption violated the compact . The Supreme Court 
was asked to decide whether the technological change, and 
the concomitant reduction in water flows, conformed to 
the Yellowstone River Compact, which provided that pre-
1950 rights “shall continue to be enjoyed in accordance 
with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water 
under the doctrine of appropriation .”25
The Supreme Court, following the special master’s 
report from 2011, concluded that the Compact did not 
prohibit pre-1950 Wyoming appropriators from increasing 
their consumption on existing acreage to the detriment of 
pre-1950 Montana appropriators . Even though the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court is not binding for prior appro-
priation states when it comes to defining their water rights, 
it serves as an analysis of how prior appropriation treats the 
change in irrigation methods with the subsequent increase 
in consumption . The position of Wyoming upstream made 
it akin to the position of a senior right holder in the river .
24 . Charles J . Meyers, A Historical and Functional Analysis of the 
Appropriation System 4 (1971) .
25 . Yellowstone River Compact, Pub . L . No . 82-231, 65 Stat . 663, art . V .A .
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As the Court concludes, prior appropriation permits 
such a change in irrigation methods, even if those changes 
may increase the amount of water used . In fact, prior 
appropriation may incentivize water rights holders to con-
sume more . Some tenets of prior appropriation illustrate 
this point .26
First, beneficial use is the “basis, the measure, and the 
limit” of an appropriation .27 It is a necessary element to 
establish a right . As a limit and a measure, beneficial use 
affects two dimensions: the type of use and the amount 
used . The type of use is of less consequence for present pur-
poses, but it is important to note that this is one element 
that has evolved through time . Initially, consistent with the 
idea of unfettered consumption to maximize production, 
only consumptive uses such as agricultural or domestic 
were considered beneficial . Increasingly, though, non-con-
sumptive ones have been recognized . Non-consumptive 
uses not only include hydropower, but also the protection 
of ecosystems .
In relation to the entitlement given by a water right, 
prior appropriation grants a right to the amount of water 
put to beneficial use . The amount put to beneficial use is 
normally measured according to the amount diverted . Ini-
tially, it was so because diversion was a way to give notice 
to other users that an appropriation was happening .28 In 
fact, the ditch capacity was the limit; a farmer could not 
obtain a right larger than the amount she could divert . It 
was assumed that someone would not build infrastruc-
ture capable of conveying more water than they needed 
because that would have been an irrational investment . In 
fact, even today, some states use diversion facilities to mea-
sure the volume of the right that is used .29 Often, however, 
26 . Montana v . Wyoming, 131 S . Ct . 1765, 179 L . Ed . 2d 799, 41 ELR 20168 
(2011) .
27 . United States v . Alpine Land & Reservoir Co ., 697 F .2d 851 (9th Cir . 1983)
The issue we review is whether the district court reached a correct 
determination of beneficial use as of 1980 . It is settled that benefi-
cial use expresses a dynamic concept, which is a “variable according 
to conditions,”  .  .  . the use cannot include any element of “waste” 
which, among other things, precludes unreasonable transmission 
loss and use of cost-ineffective methods .
 Cost-effective methods is a very open-ended concept .
28 . Barton H . Thompson Jr . et al ., Legal Control of Water Resources 
216 (5th ed . 2013) .
  In Montana v. Wyoming, the special master considered that depletion 
could not be the measure of the right . Instead he, and the majority of the 
Supreme Court, believed that the compact adopted diversion as the measure 
as it was conventional at the time, while depletion was unfamiliar . Supple-
mental Opinion of the Special Master on Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss 
Bill of Complaint 9 (Sept . 4, 2009) [hereinafter Supplemental Opinion] on 
Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota, No .137 .
  “Under prior appropriation, a diversion traditionally served dual pur-
poses—providing notice of a user’s intent to appropriate water, and defining 
the extent of the use .” In re Adjudication of Existing Rights to the Use of All 
Water, 2002 MT 216, P22 (Mont . 2002) .
29 . The definition of conserved water in Oregon takes existing diversion as the 
measure to calculate the baseline against which to measure conservation . 
Or . Admin . R . 690-018-0020(4):
“Conserved Water” means that amount of water that results 
from conservation measures, measured as the difference between: 
(a)  The smaller of the amount stated on the water right or the 
maximum amount of water that can be diverted using the existing 
facilities; and (b) The amount of water needed after implementa-
tion of conservation measures to meet the beneficial use under the 
water right certificate .
the amount in the paper right, which was normally based 
just on the declaration of the appropriator, was larger than 
the amount really put to use because the facilities were not 
used to their full capacity .
Today, overstating rights is less common because the 
agencies or the state engineers approve the applications . 
However, agencies work under the premise that users are 
not employing all the water they have been granted .30 For 
example, in California, where the recording system is still 
incomplete,31 rights have been granted for five times the 
amount of water available .32 Such a situation exacerbates 
the effects of allowing right holders to consume all the 
water they were granted because other users have been rely-
ing for decades on those users’ return flows .
Even though many have labeled irrigation practices 
like flood or furrow wasteful because some water evap-
orates and other goes back to the river, these practices 
have not been outlawed by a thorough enforcement of 
beneficial use .33 A beneficial use is a reasonable one34 and 
there is no vested right to waste water .35 Rarely enforced, 
the prohibition against waste has focus on the means 
of conveyance36 or certain outrageous practices such as 
drowning gophers . But irrigation practices have not been 
tackled . Waste provisions have been interpreted in a way 
that is very deferential to the irrigator’s choice of irriga-
tion method .37 Beneficial use has thus not worked as a 
technology-forcing doctrine .38 This current understand-
ing of beneficial use that accepts historical irrigation 
practices is often criticized for not encouraging conser-
30 . Adell Amos, Freshwater Conservation in the Context of Energy and Climate 
Policy: Assessing Progress and Identifying Challenges in Oregon and the Western 
United States, 12 U . Denv . Water L . Rev . 1, 42 (2011) .
31 . Theodore E . Grantham & Joshua H . Viers, 100 Years of California’s Water 
Rights System: Patterns, Trends, and Uncertainty, 9 Envtl . Res . Letters 1, 3 
(2014) .
32 . Id .
33 . For a critical view of this interpretation as one that undermines prior 
appropriation itself, see Reed D . Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: 
Protecting Established Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of 
Prior Appropriation, 28 Envtl . L . 881 (1998) .
34 . State Dep’t of Ecology v . Grimes, 121 Wash . 2d 459, 852 P .2d 1044 (Wash . 
1993) .
  The current Washington definition is: “Beneficial use involves the 
application of a reasonable quantity of water to a non-wasteful use, such 
as irrigation, domestic water supply, or power generation, to name a few .” 
State of Washington, Department of Ecology, Water Rights, http://www .ecy .
wa .gov/programs/wr/rights/water-right-home .html (last visited Oct . 12, 
2016) .
35 . David H . Getches, Water Law in a Nutshell 129 (2009) .
36 . Tonkin v . Winzell, 27 Nev . 88 (Nev . 1903) . State ex rel . Crowley v . District 
Court, 88 P .2d 23 (Mont . 1939) . When some conveyance means have been 
considered wasteful, the parties claiming the waste may be required to pay 
part of the cost of the works to decrease waste and improve the efficiency of 
the conveyance means .
37 . “[A]n appropriator cannot be compelled to divert according to the most 
scientific method known . He is entitled to make a reasonable use of the 
water according to the general custom of the locality .” Janet C . Neuman, 
Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture; The Inefficient Search for Efficient 
Western Water Use, 28 Envtl . L . 919, 933 (1998) .
38 . Richard B . Stewart & Bruce A . Ackerman, Reforming Environmental Law, 
37 Stan . L . Rev . 1333 (1985) . This is no different though than other 
technology-forcing provisions adopted in antipollution statutes . When 
an industry is subject to a best available technology provision, its permit 
includes neither a vague reference imposing the most innovative technology 
available nor a specific technology; instead, it quantifies how much pollutant 
the permittee may discharge .
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vation .39 The current interpretation may change, but that 
is yet to be seen .40
Given that the volume a water right entitled has been 
roughly measured as the amount diverted, return flow 
was included in the right . The doctrine of recapture con-
firms it . With few exceptions, a farmer or other water right 
holder can recapture water before it leaves her property and 
returns to the stream from which it came .41 The common 
example to understand this doctrine is a user who employs 
flood irrigation and thus returns a lot of water to the river, 
and who builds a little paved ditch at the end of her prop-
erty to collect water that would otherwise be lost to her 
use because it was returning to the stream . Even though 
junior users acquire rights to the stream as it exists42 and 
depend on return flow, junior appropriators relying on oth-
ers’ “waste” often have no legal claim to it .43
Another way to present the claim made by this Article is 
to argue that return flow is insufficiently protected; those 
who are relying on return flow should not be at the mercy 
of other senior or upstream irrigators who decide to change 
their crops or their irrigation systems . There are very few 
39 . There seems to be a contradiction between two values that waste provisions 
may embody: economic efficiency and stability . While the anti-waste tenet 
in beneficial use seems to be based on utilitarian values, the interpretation 
seems to be based on stability and preservation of the status quo . Michael 
Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 Ariz . L . Rev . 741 (2014) .
40 . Neuman, supra note 37 .
41 . Montana v . Wyoming, 131 S . Ct . 1765, 1775, 179 L . Ed . 2d 799, 41 ELR 
20168 (2011) .
42 . As stated in Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co.:
This court has often said, in substance, that a junior appropriator of 
water to a beneficial use has a vested right, as against his senior, in a 
continuation of the conditions on the stream as they existed at the 
time he made his appropriation . If this means anything, it is that 
when the junior appropriator makes his appropriation he acquires 
a vested right in the conditions then prevailing upon the stream, 
and surrounding the general method of use of water therefrom . 
He has a right to assume that these are fixed conditions and will so 
remain, at least without substantial change, unless it appears that a 
proposed change will not work harm to his vested rights .
 Vogel v . Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co ., 107 P . 1108, 1111 (Colo . 
1910) . The change planned by a senior in this case was changing the point 
of diversion, but the principle it states should encompass the change of 
irrigation methods .
43 . Recapture must happen on one’s property before water has returned to the 
stream . In the interstate water dispute mentioned above, Montana argued 
that this rule does not apply when the water returns to the same stream from 
which it was originally drawn, citing the Utah case Estate of Steed v. New 
Escalante Irrigation Corp., 846 P .2d 1223 (Utah 1992) . In this case, an estate 
was unable to collect damages from an irrigation corporation that changed 
its flood irrigation to a pipe-based sprinkler system, because the runoff 
from irrigation would not have reached the same stream from which the 
water was taken . Lawrence MacDonnell, analyzing Montana’s arguments in 
Montana v. Wyoming in relation to this issue, claims that:
the doctrine [of recapture] should be limited to those appropria-
tions that contemplated the necessity for such recapture to achieve 
their intended beneficial purpose . Otherwise, water properly di-
verted and applied to beneficial use that remains unconsumed after 
use should be regarded as returned to the hydrologic system and 
available for use according to state laws once it leaves the appro-
priator’s lands .
 Lawrence J . MacDonnell, Montana v . Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation 
Water Use Efficiency, and the Doctrine of Recapture, 5 Golden Gate U . 
Envtl . L .J . 265 (2012) . MacDonnell would require an intention for 
recapture to be allowed . He proposes the application of his reinstatement 
of the doctrine to apply across the board, no matter the technicalities of 
the different states’ water laws that differentiate between seepage, wastage, 
drainage, or return flow .
cases where those relying on return flow have been pro-
tected, and none refers to changes in irrigation methods 
or change of crops .44 According to Tarlock, in protecting 
return flow, these decisions show a preference for equity 
over efficiency under prior appropriation .45 This Article 
argues that in terms of both equity and efficiency, return 
flow should no longer be part of the water right of the user 
returning it to the river .
A farmer entitled to consume as much as she diverted 
will do so if it is beneficial for her to consume as much . 
She may have incentives to consume all the water she has 
a right to divert, not only because that amount may allow 
her to produce more, but because of regulatory incentives . 
Under prior appropriation, water rights can be forfeited 
if they go unused for a specified period of time, no mat-
ter what the intent of the user is . The “use-it-or-lose-it” 
doctrine implies the loss of all or a portion of the right . 
Those forfeiture provisions may motivate the farmer to 
divert as much as possible46 and, where using technically 
efficient irrigation techniques, the majority or all of the 
water diverted will be consumed . Given that an increase in 
consumption is likely to harm other users, forfeiture provi-
sions alone cannot achieve their original aim of protecting 
the investments made by juniors who were relying on the 
unused rights of others .47
Junior users have another source of protection: senior 
water right holders may have priority in times of shortage 
but they cannot do all they please . Some changes in their 
water rights are subject to the “no-injury” rule, which holds 
that a senior appropriator cannot make certain changes in 
the way it uses its water if they would harm the junior user . 
Montana and Wyoming, for example, require prior appro-
priators to apply for a change in their right when they plan 
to alter the type of use, the place of use, or the point of 
diversion . This rule reflects the reality that such changes 
may harm other users in the stream since they alter the 
quantity and quality of the flow . The no-injury rule does 
not apply to changes in consumptive use caused by a 
change in irrigation methods or crops .48
44 . For a comment on these cases, see George Radosevich, Western Water 
Laws and Irrigation Return Flow 75, 100 (1978) . Two illustrative cases 
are Kovacovich and Shelton Farms . In Kovacovich [Salt River Valley Water 
Users’ Ass’n v . Kovacovich, 3 Ariz . App . 28, 411 P .2d 201 (Ariz . Ct . App . 
1966)], the court found against a farmer who lined her ditches and used 
the recovered water to irrigate land beyond that for which the water right 
was granted . In Shelton Farms [Southeastern Colo . Water Conservancy 
Dist . v . Shelton Farms, Inc ., 529 P .2d 1321 (Colo . 1974)], the person who 
eliminated phreatophytes was found not to be entitled to the water those 
plants used to consume and, instead, the downstream users were .
45 . Tarlock, supra note 3, at 156 .
46 . Krista Koehl, Partial Forfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon Compromises 
Traditional Principles to Achieve Flexibility, 38 Envtl . L . 1137, 1139 (1998) . 
In re Willow Creek, 144 P . 505 (Or . 1914), is a decision that states that the 
water saved by more efficient irrigation systems is forfeited to the state .
47 . Charles B . Roe & William J . Brooks, Loss of Water Rights: Old Ways and 
New, 35 Rocky Mtn . Min . L . Inst 1, 3 (1989) .
48 . Bower v . Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 77 Wyo . 80 (Wyo . 1957) (“If the senior 
appropriator by a different method of irrigation can so utilize his water 
that it is all consumed in transpiration and consumptive use and no waste 
water returns by seepage or percolation to the river, no other appropriator 
can complain .”) . However, in that case, water was not returning to the 
same stream .
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For example, a farmer in Arizona has the right to change 
from maize production to sugarcane, which consumes 
twice as much water,49 and to disregard the effects this 
will have on junior appropriators . The same farmer can-
not move her production to a different farmland further 
upstream if the flow of the river would be affected and her 
former junior downstream neighbor would be harmed . 
That farmer who was originally growing maize will not 
be able to grow sugarcane upstream because it consumes 
more and it will harm other users . The differential treat-
ment of those different changes, even though their effects 
on juniors are similar, seems incoherent and lacks a justifi-
cation in terms of allocation efficiency or fairness .
Another source of inconsistency arises in relation to 
water transactions . A user can transfer her water right but 
the transfer is subject to the no-injury rule . In practice, 
this rule has meant that only the amount historically con-
sumed can be transferred .50 It can be said that water rights 
have different definitions when used by the original right 
holder than when transferred . If the farmer growing maize 
sells the water to another farmer who has a field of similar 
acreage growing sugarcane, the latter will most likely be 
permitted to consume only as much water as the former 
was consuming when growing maize .
B. Statutes Encouraging Agricultural Water 
Conservation
Even though the general definition of rights under prior 
appropriation does not protect junior users or the environ-
ment from changes in irrigation methods or crops, some 
state statutes encouraging conservation have acknowledged 
the paradox exposed in this Article—that technologically 
efficient irrigation methods may increase consumption . 
Those statutes do not understand conservation as a syn-
onym of development of supplies through dams as it was 
understood in the past, but as a way to save water by some 
users to ensure other users can satisfy their demands . These 
statutes give incentives to shift irrigation methods granting 
rights over the conserved water to the right holder imple-
menting the conservation practices, protecting her also 
from forfeiture . Some statutes also give financial incentives 
to farmers to help them fund the initial capital investment 
needed to implement technically efficient irrigation prac-
tices . The statutes either define conservation plainly as a 
reduction in the amount consumed historically or subject 
the right to conserved water to a no-injury rule .
In 1992, California enacted the Agricultural Water 
Conservation and Management Act . The Act defined 
conservation as “the reduction of the amount of water 
consumed or irretrievably lost in the process of satisfying 
beneficial uses which can be achieved either by improv-
ing the technology or the method for diverting, transport-
49 . Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
Irrigation Water Management: Irrigation Water Needs ch . 3 (1986), 
available at http://www .fao .org/docrep/S2022E/s2022e07 .htm .
50 . See infra Section III .C .
ing, applying, reusing, salvaging, or recovering water, or 
by implementing other conservation methods .”51 This is a 
satisfactory definition of conservation, understood as an 
increase in overall efficiency in water allocation, such that 
no one will be made worse off . Washington’s Trust Water 
Rights Program, enacted in 1991, refers to “net water sav-
ings,” which are defined as:
the amount of water that is determined to be conserved 
and usable within a specified stream reach or reaches for 
other purposes without impairment or detriment to water 
rights existing at the time that a water conservation proj-
ect is undertaken, reducing the ability to deliver water, or 
reducing the supply of water that would otherwise have 
been available to existing uses .
Washington and California have regulated conserva-
tion as the reduction in consumption, not giving farmers 
the possibility of double-dipping by profiting from their 
own purportedly wasteful practices and receiving subsidies 
for not conserving water . Thus, in those states, the farmer 
installing drip irrigation has the choice of keeping her right 
as it is, perhaps facing a reduction in the amount she is 
entitled to as a result of her reduced diversion under drip 
irrigation, consuming more water, or reducing consump-
tion and being able to take title to the amount of water she 
no longer consumes .
The definition of conservation as the reduction in con-
sumption has not been adopted everywhere . Oregon used 
to define conservation as “the amount of water, previ-
ously unavailable to subsequent appropriators, that results 
from conservation measures .” But this policy did not suc-
ceed, and very few applications were received . In 2003, 
a new statute defined conservation as “the reduction of 
the amount of water diverted to satisfy an existing ben-
eficial use achieved either by improving the technology or 
method for diverting, transporting, applying or recover-
ing the water or by implementing other approved conser-
vation measures .”52
Apparently, the explanation behind the adoption of 
such a definition is one of public choice . Agricultural 
interests convinced the Oregon Legislature that this more 
open-ended definition would still generate incentives for 
conservation . It may indeed generate incentives to install 
sprinklers or drip irrigation pipes conserving water that 
would otherwise be lost to evaporation, but it may not con-
tribute to overall water efficiency if the consumptive use 
is increased despite the reduction in diversion . Strangely 
51 . Cal . Water Code §10521(a), the Agricultural Water Conservation and 
Management Act .
52 . Or . Rev . Stat . §537 .455: Definitions for ORS 537 .455 to 537 .500 and 
540 .510 .
  Colorado has never successfully passed a conservation statute, but the 
Colorado Water Conservation Board uses a definition based on decrease in 
use: “Water conservation is any beneficial reduction in water loss, waste, 
or use . It is the reduction in water use accomplished by implementation 
of water conservation or water efficiency measures . It is improved water 
management practices that reduce or enhance the beneficial use of water .”
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enough, environmental groups supported the statute, 
equating reduced diversion with reduced consumption .53
In addition, Oregon’s conservation statute allows the 
farmer to keep 75% of the water conserved, while the 
other 25% is allocated to the state . The 25% might be 
reduced if the farmer has received public funds to pay for 
the change in irrigation systems . This division of the water 
conserved—that is, the amount by which the diversion has 
been reduced—suggests that the fear of forfeiture for not 
diverting all of it may have been a concern . However, in 
order to determine the amount conserved, the reduction 
of diversion is reduced to ensure that other water rights 
are not harmed . This means that a farmer can increase her 
consumption by implementing conservation policies, but 
will only acquire a right over the amount conserved if her 
change does not impose negative externalities on other 
users . There is no mention of negative effects on the envi-
ronment, but the allocation of 25% of the conserved water 
may mitigate those concerns . The fact that the statute limits 
the amount of water conserved that the user implementing 
conservation practices is entitled to when other users are 
harmed implies that conservation practices will be treated 
more favorably in streams where water is abundant .
Even though the definitions of conservation in the three 
statutes analyzed take into account the paradox exposed 
in the scientific literature, the farmer may still prefer to do 
without the incentives and shift irrigation methods . If the 
general definition of prior appropriation is not changed, 
a farmer may still find it more profitable to shift irriga-
tion methods, increasing consumption . It may be more 
profitable because of the higher yield she produces when 
consuming more and because if she increases the amount 
consumed today, she will be able to sell a higher amount 
of water in the future . Profits from increased consump-
tion may be higher than the profits from a lower yield and 
lower water application under drip irrigation today and the 
expected profits from using or selling, subject to a more 
streamlined procedure, the amount of water she no longer 
consumes immediately .
It is important to note that the conservation statutes 
analyzed in this Article assume that the farmer was not 
wasting water before,54 which means that although many 
consider flood or furrow irrigation practices wasteful and 
inefficient, the statutes allow farmers to profit from their 
previous inefficiency .
Unfortunately, not all initiatives to promote conserva-
tion have protected other users from the potential increase 
in consumption . This is the case of federal agricultural 
programs . The federal Agricultural Water Enhancement 
Program, part of the Farm Bill’s Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (EQIP), was proven not to achieve real 
water conservation . Bills were introduced to correct it,55 
53 . Ray Huffaker & Normal Whittlesey, The Allocative Efficiency and 
Conservation Potential of Water Laws Encouraging Investments in On-Farm 
Irrigation Technology, 24 Agric . Econ . 47, 58 (2000) .
54 . Neuman, supra note 37, at 957 .
55 . As part of the EQIP, the U .S . Department of Agriculture (USDA) Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) Agricultural Water Enhancement 
but they were ultimately not approved . These programs 
gave subsidies to farmers to implement technically effi-
cient irrigation methods, sometimes in cooperation with 
the states .56 Given the potential increase in consumption 
and the effects on other users and the environment, those 
subsidies may not render social benefits .57
III. Better Incentives Through a New 
Measure of Rights: Consumptive Volume
A. Definition
Montana v. Wyoming showed the effects at an interstate 
level of shifts of irrigation methods, but similar situations 
must be arising internally as well . Recently, state policy-
makers have started to acknowledge the problems that 
accompany shifts to efficient irrigation systems . As more 
efficient methods are adopted, some farmers may produce 
more, but less water may be available for other users . The 
conservation statutes of Oregon, Washington, and Califor-
nia illustrate that states are starting to realize the effects . 
Those statutes only count as savings the reductions in con-
sumption, not only the adoption of efficient irrigation sys-
tems that divert less . None of the states have addressed it 
in the general regulation of water rights . The New Mexico 
Interstate Stream Commission commissioned a report to 
study precisely the increase in consumption that a shift 
from flood to drip irrigation can bring about .58 But New 
Mexico has yet to take measures to address it . It is time 
that prior appropriation evolves, like it has done in the past 
to adapt to changes in social values .
Today, consumptive use, as the Idaho Code puts it, 
is not part of the definition of the right . The amount of 
water put to use when a right holder appropriates the right 
Program (repealed by the 2014 Farm Bill; see http://www .nrcs .usda .gov/
wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/awep/) funded several 
of these projects . NRCS would pay up to $400 per acre, which means it 
would cover from 25% to 50% of the capital cost of drip irrigation per acre .
  In 2013, Sen . Tom Udall (D-N .M .) introduced a bill to make sure that 
taxpayer-funded irrigation improvements result in real savings (S . 923, 
113th Cong . (2013/2014)—Balancing Food, Farm, and the Environment 
Act of 2013) after several studies showed that federal subsidies aiming at 
conservation translated into more water consumption . Ron Nixon, Farm 
Subsidies Leading to More Water Use, N .Y . Times, June 6, 2013, http://www .
nytimes .com/2013/06/07/us/irrigation-subsidies-leading-to-more-water-
use .html?_r=0 .
56 . In Montana, EQIP aids farmers in switching to more efficient irrigation 
systems, generally from flood irrigation to center-pivot sprinkler irrigation . 
To receive the funding, farmers must complete the Farm Irrigation 
Rating Index (FIRI), which predicts the increase in efficiency that would 
result from switching irrigation systems given specific data provided by 
the individual . FIRI must report at least a 10% hypothetical increase in 
efficiency to ensure eligibility . The FIRI measure of efficiency is neither a 
measure of consumption nor diversion . It is a calculation that takes into 
account conveyance efficiency and application efficiency . Thus, the goal of 
EQIP in Montana is not conservation in the sense of reducing consumptive 
use . Rather, the focus is to increase water productivity or yield .
57 . Ward & Pulido-Velázquez, supra note 4, at 18219 .
58 . New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission, Remote-Sensing-
Based Comparison of Water Consumption by Drip-Irrigated 
Versus Flood-Irrigated Fields (2013), available at http://nmawsa .org/
ongoing-work/agricultural-water-use/comparison-of-water-consumption- 
by-drip-irrigated-versus-flood-irrigated-fields/view .
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defines the volume of the said right .59 It is normally mea-
sured according to the volume diverted . But this needs 
to change . I propose to define water rights both in terms 
of diversion and in terms of consumption or depletion . 
Adopting consumption as part of the right’s definition will 
prevent the detrimental incentives to right holders when 
adopting modern irrigation technologies, sometimes aided 
by public subsidies funding part of the cost of that invest-
ment . But it will also address the effects of other farming 
decisions such as a change in crops .
In short, this Article proposes that the farmer should 
lose the right to her return flow . Or in other words, a right 
holder will be entitled to keep diverting the same amount 
but could only consume the amount she had been consum-
ing on average over the past five years, whether or not she 
changes the method of irrigation or the crops . The num-
ber of years across which to average consumption may be 
debatable, but five years is a common measure in water law . 
For example, in Washington State, the amount of water 
that a consumptive user can donate, sell, or lease to the 
state to become a trust water right, that is, a right on behalf 
of the environment, is calculated according to the extent 
the right was exercised in the past five years .60 This histori-
cal account should mitigate the potential moral hazard of 
increasing the consumption in the very last period before 
the measure was implemented .
Under this proposal, a farmer could decide to keep irri-
gating using flood or furrow irrigation, diverting the same 
amount and consuming the same amount . She could also 
choose to install sprinklers and divert less, but she will not 
be able to consume more than she did in the status quo . 
Even without increasing her consumption when shifting to 
sprinklers or drip, her plants may be consuming more than 
in the status quo where she used flood irrigation because 
part of the ET was lost due to evaporation, but with drip 
there may not be any evaporation .
Under my proposal, in the example used in Section I, 
farmer A, who has a prior appropriation right of 5 ac-ft, 
could only consume 2 .2 ac-ft . This is the amount she con-
sumed when she was flooding her field to grow alfalfa . If 
she decides to change the irrigation method, as she does in 
Scenario 2, she will not be able to consume 2 .7 ac-ft as she 
did in that example . She would have to keep consuming 
2 .2 ac-ft at most even though her right would have entitled 
her to divert 5 ac-ft . Where using drip, the 2 .2 ac-ft may 
be consumed by the plants, while with flooding, part of the 
amount consumed is lost to evaporation .
In my proposal, current total forfeiture rules will apply 
to both dimensions: diversion and consumption . That is, 
completely unused rights will be forfeited . Partial forfei-
ture rules should not apply when the change in the amount 
diverted comes from better irrigation practices or changes 
to less water-intensive crops . Once the consumptive volume 
a right entitles has been defined, reductions in consump-
tion could be sold or leased to other users . Those reductions 
59 . Idaho Code §42-202B .
60 . Wash . Rev . Code §90 .42 .080(4) .
shall be protected from forfeiture in order to give incentives 
to adopt better irrigation practices, as California’s con-
servation statute does . Users would be protected to keep 
diverting as much as they were diverting .
Conversely, if partial forfeiture rules applied to diver-
sion, they could be mostly innocuous to the farmer . If a 
farmer installs a more advanced irrigation system and only 
allows it to consume the amount that under the prior sys-
tem was depleted, she will be diverting less than before . 
However, for her, losing the difference between the vol-
ume she diverts today and the volume she diverted in the 
past has no effect . She has no incentive to divert more in 
the future, because to do that will imply uninstalling the 
new equipment and losing the investment, only to divert 
more but consume the same .61 Having said that, since there 
might be new innovations in irrigation that could perhaps 
require more diversion for the same consumption, diver-
sion needs to remain as one, but not the only, measure of 
a water right . Consequently, it would be better to derogate 
partial forfeiture provisions for these cases . Additionally, 
she may be able to sell a non-consumptive right to the total 
amount diverted .
For new permits, including the amount consumed in 
the definition of rights could be an opportunity to adopt 
a technology-forcing provision .62 Agencies granting water 
permits could define the consumptive and diversion vol-
umes of a right according to the best available irrigation 
technology instead of their current practice of granting 
the amount requested by private parties within the limit 
of the water duties,63 which tend to be too generous . For 
new permits, drip or microspray may be the technology 
chosen because they reduce evaporation and fewer pollut-
ants end up in the river . Agencies could tailor the volume 
to each permit depending on the soil and the crop because 
the agencies will already have the relevant information in 
order to regulate existing permits . Alternatively, they could 
create a duty of water, which averages water needs accord-
61 . This would mean that in some cases the river flow may be reduced—not 
the amount available for others to use—between the point of intake and the 
return of the farmer who is diverting more than before, but not more than 
she was diverting in the first place . Thus, some small externalities may occur 
that may need to be disregarded .
62 . Arizona’s groundwater management regulations include a technology-
forcing provision for non-irrigation uses at Ariz . Rev . Stat . Ann . §45-566 .
63 . Another application of the reasonable-use requirement centers on the water 
duty required to satisfy the appropriator’s end use . “Water duty” is generally 
equated with the amount of water that, through efficient and prudent 
management without unnecessary waste, is reasonably required for land to 
produce a maximum amount of crops as are ordinarily grown . “The extent 
of the duty to conserve must take into account what conservation measures 
are financially and physically feasible .” Water duty requirements take into 
consideration the amount of water that may adequately serve the water 
requirements of various end uses . The appropriator is not entitled to apply 
water to an end use in a wasteful manner .
  Cal . Water Code §1004 provides that 2 .5 ac-ft of water per acre 
is the maximum amount of water that can be applied to uncultivated 
land . Other water duty factors have been established by the State Water 
Resources Control Board and are contained in Cal . Code Regs . tit . 23, 
§697 . In the absence of a statutory guideline, the applicable water duty 
is a question of fact that is dependent on the particular circumstances of 
any given case . Scott S . Slater, 1-2 California Water Law and Policy 
§2 .27 (LexisNexis 2015) .
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ing to the most common crops in the area when using the 
irrigation technology of their choice .
B. Effects of the Proposal
1. Reliance of Junior Appropriators
The priority system in prior appropriation is a mechanism 
for sharing the effects of a drought . When there is not 
enough water to satisfy the rights of everyone, those who 
appropriated the right first will be served first . Senior users 
are normally farmers and, thus, they are not necessarily the 
ones that value the water most . Similarly, it is implausible 
to assume that upstream farmers are more productive than 
downstream ones . At equal priority, upstream users have 
an advantage over downstream users under the current sys-
tem: if rights are just measured according to diversion, and 
upstream consumption increases, the users downstream 
will have less water available to them .
The above is what happened in Montana v. Wyoming, 
where pre-1950 appropriators from both states have the 
same priority . However, because Wyoming appropriators 
decided to change their crops or irrigation methods, there 
was not enough water downstream . Similarly, groundwa-
ter users, where groundwater and surface water are regu-
lated as if they were two separate bodies of water, may see 
their aquifers depleted not by their pumping, but because 
some surface water right holders have consumed more 
than they used to and, thus, the recharge of the aquifer has 
been reduced .64
Those junior or downstream appropriators have been 
relying on that return-flow water for decades . Diversion 
was a sound measure in the past because it was admin-
istrable, but so was relying on the river as junior appro-
priators or downstream users found it . Those users knew 
that if it was a dry year, they may not get enough water . 
They could not expect that upstream or senior appropria-
tors would start using their paper rights in full, despite 
the doctrines of recapture . Any of those users relying on 
the river as it flows to them “frequently cannot ascertain 
what portion of the flow of a stream is natural and what 
portion represents return flow from upstream users .”65 
Recapture of runoff is more the exception than the 
rule .66 Those other users, who relied on the return flow 
that some farmers have now reduced, are the ones whose 
investment-backed expectations may be defeated under 
the current system if the adoption of new irrigation tech-
nologies keeps growing .
64 . This could happen, for example, in Pixley Irrigation District (California); 
see Brett Walton, Spending to Conserve Water on California Farms Will Not 
Increase Supply, Circle of Blue, Feb . 28, 2014, http://www .circleofblue .
org/waternews/2014/world/conserve-water-california-not-increase-supply/ .
65 . George A . Gould, Water Use and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, in 
Western Water; Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies (Natural Resources 
Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law 1986), http://scholar .law .
colorado .edu/cgi/viewcontent .cgi?article=1008&context=western-water- 
expanding-uses-finite-supplies .
66 . See Section II .
2. Streamflow Unaltered
The example in Section II focuses on the interaction 
between two farmers . However, there are other users in the 
river that may be affected by the increase in consumption 
that prior appropriation embraces and that some conserva-
tion statutes sanction . In particular, fish and wildlife are 
likely to be affected by an increase in consumption, because 
there will be less water flowing . The decrease in flow does 
not necessarily happen when there is a change in one of the 
characteristics of a right or when it is transferred, and these 
changes are subject to a review to prevent uncompensated 
effects on third parties and the environment .67
Environmental concerns have increased in recent 
decades and in particular in the area of water manage-
ment, where they are expressed in legal regimes like the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA),68 the public trust doctrine, 
and the protection of instream flows . Instream flows have 
been protected via, among other things, minimum flow 
requirements or non-consumptive rights . The decision of 
the Supreme Court in Montana v. Wyoming69 pays lip ser-
vice to this developing central theme in the way society 
views water . Its analysis focuses only on the theme that 
existed at the birth of prior appropriation: water as a com-
modity . Water was an input to make our economies thrive 
through unfettered consumption .70
Today, both beneficial use and the regulation of water 
transfers reflect that regard for the environment . Related to 
beneficial use and its evolution, the inclusion of instream 
non-consumptive uses as beneficial uses stands out . Nowa-
days, private organizations and/or administrative agencies 
can hold rights to protect fish and wildlife . Our concern 
for fish species and river ecosystems is also reflected in the 
approval procedure in water markets . Transfers of con-
served water for less than one year, which imply a decrease 
in diversion, are subject to a less demanding procedure in 
California, because fewer effects are expected when less 
water is used . However, those transactions are still subject 
to a binding standard that they produce “no unreasonable 
effects on fish and wildlife .”71 This supplemental provision 
is necessary because the transactions may alter the geogra-
phy of where water flows, as in any change to a water right . 
Even in the absence of a regulation imposing limits on the 
amount consumed or not imposing compensation of harm 
to other users, minimum streamflows should be protected 
from these changes . In this regard, it may be advisable for 
states to at least adopt a provision similar to Oregon’s con-
servation statute, which allocates 25% of the water con-
served to the state .
67 . See id .
68 . 16 U .S .C . §§1531-1544, ELR Stat . ESA §§2-18 .
69 . Montana v . Wyoming, 131 S . Ct . 1765, 179 L . Ed . 2d 799, 41 ELR 20168 
(2011) .
70 . Barton H . Thompson, Water as a Public Commodity, 95 Marq . L . Rev . 17, 
23-24 (2011); Steven J . Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint 
for Change, 61 Or . L . Rev . 483 (1982) (“Antiquated legal interpretations 
unsuited to a conservation ethic restrict the ability to manage wisely the 
limited waters of the arid west .”) .
71 . Cal . Water Code §1011(b) .
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3. Fewer Incentives to Grow Water-Intensive 
Crops
If rights are defined according to consumptive use, not only 
will changes in irrigation methods not increase the amount 
of water depleted from the basin, but neither will changes 
in crops . Today, a farmer can change from soybeans to 
alfalfa without applying for a change in the irrigation per-
mit .72 The expansion of almond farming in California has 
received many critiques in the midst of the current drought 
because almonds are a permanent crop that cannot be fal-
lowed and consumes more water than tomatoes or grapes .73
It is not feasible for a state water agency to police which 
crop each farmer is growing, and such policing seems to 
interfere too much with business decisions by the farmer . 
Agricultural models could be used to analyze those 
changes and how they affect other users, but if the pro-
posal of this Article were to be adopted, there would be no 
need to require a farmer to apply for a change in a water 
right when deciding to plant a different crop . However, if a 
farmer decided to stop growing her current crop, she would 
need to choose a crop that consumes the same or less water, 
or plant it only in part of her acreage to ensure that her 
consumption does not increase .
4. Incentives to Shift Irrigation Methods 
Still Exist
Adoption of irrigation technologies such as drip irrigation 
could be beneficial if consumption would not increase . 
They could be socially beneficial because, among other 
effects, there would not be pollutants sent to the river via 
the return flow or runoff, thus creating savings in water 
purification, and fewer negative impacts on the environ-
ment, except for the potential increase in soil salinity in 
some areas . It may be argued that the proposal set forth in 
this Article decreases the incentives to adopt drip irrigation 
or sprinklers, even though those are beneficial for water 
quality, by not allowing users to consume more than they 
were consuming before . A farmer when deciding whether 
to install drip or sprinklers may decide not to if he cannot 
increase the amount he is consuming with a more tradi-
tional irrigation method .
My proposal tackles the potential negative externality—
less water available—that shifting to technically efficient 
irrigation methods imposes on other users who are relying 
on the return flow that a user has been returning to the 
river for decades . Drip or sprinklers may have a positive 
externality—reduced pollution—too . However, these two 
effects on third parties are not in the same currency (water 
quantity versus water quality), and the trade off cannot be 
made by assuming the positive externality is overall more 
socially beneficial .
72 . Section II .B . above explains which changes require a change in the permit .
73 . California Almond Growers to Expand Orchards, Despite Drought, 
Sacramento Bee, Apr . 16, 2014 .
This Article addresses the negative externality in terms 
of increased consumption and leaves the management of 
nonpoint source pollution problems to clean water regula-
tions . Given that nonpoint sources of water pollution—
mainly agricultural runoff draining into the rivers—can 
be regulated, as is the case in some states, compliance with 
those regulations may give further incentives to farmers to 
change irrigation methods if it were the less costly way to 
do so . For example, if a tradable water quality program 
were in place, farmers may decide to reduce the amount 
they pollute by installing drip or sprinklers and sell the 
credit to pollute to an industrial polluter .
The shift to drip and sprinklers may also be beneficial 
for individual farmers because they will also save in variable 
costs . They will save because drip and sprinkler technolo-
gies are less labor-intensive, and they increase yield; they 
produce more crop per drop . And there may be more drops 
because by shifting irrigation methods, the farmer can cap-
ture the amount of water that was evaporating when she 
used furrow or flood . Jurisdictions could design the mea-
sure of consumption to include more than the water previ-
ously consumed by plants and irretrievably lost . It could 
include the amount evaporated, increasing the incentives 
farmers would have to change irrigation methods .
Drip or sprinklers require some capital investment 
upfront . Modern irrigation technologies are costly, and per-
haps unaffordable for many farmers, because in the short 
term the increase in yield will not be enough to recover 
the initial capital investment .74 Multiple jurisdictions have 
adopted subsidies in order to decrease the costs that farm-
ers face in adopting those technologies . Those subsidies 
could still work under the proposal set forth here . Perhaps, 
subsidies are even more necessary, because the increase in 
yield would be less if consumption after the installation 
cannot be higher than consumption under flood irrigation . 
If rights were defined according to consumptive use, those 
subsidies will be achieving their real goal .
It may be asked why we should have the taxpayer pay for 
those irrigation methods . To decrease the need for public 
subsidies, it could be said that perhaps it would be better 
to keep current policy where the farmer can increase the 
amount consumed so that she can recover the investment 
more quickly . In fact, one argument made in passing in the 
special master’s report for Montana v. Wyoming is that we 
want farmers to be more efficient, even though the result of 
adopting those policies is reduced instream flow for other 
users .75 Another way to give incentives without relying on 
subsidies would be to grant rights to the amount of water 
saved, as California does . But granting that right requires 
real water savings; consumption must be lower than in the 
status quo and, thus, yield may be also lower .
74 . The cost of installing sprinklers is around $550 per acre and installing drip 
irrigation can average $1,200 per acre . Howard Neibling, Irrigation 
Systems for Idaho Agriculture (University of Idaho, College of 
Agriculture 1997); Steve Amosson et al ., Economics of Irrigation 
Systems (2011) .
75 . Supplemental Opinion, supra note 28, at 29 .
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A savings-sharing arrangement like the Oregon legisla-
tion established, where the farmer could keep part of the 
water she saved but another part is allocated to the state in 
proportion to the funds provided, would also be advisable . 
Hence, establishing the volume historically consumed as 
a definitional variable will allow those systems that grant 
rights to the amount of water conserved to work more effi-
ciently . Farmers should therefore have more incentives to 
introduce innovations that actually save water . Those regu-
lations, modeled after the California one, could be a com-
panion to the proposal set up here .
In many situations, though, it makes economic sense 
to adopt drip irrigation even without increasing consump-
tion and without receiving subsidies .76 The Lower Arkan-
sas Water Management Association proposed a plan for 
2015/2016 to be approved by the division engineer in which 
the improvements in irrigation do not imply an increase in 
consumption . The owner of three farms changed the irriga-
tion method from flood to center pivot sprinklers . Center 
pivot sprinklers reduce the surface irrigated because the 
corners of the farm cannot be reached by the water . Even 
reducing the acreage and keeping consumption constant, 
the farmer installed sprinklers and he benefited from it . In 
this case, no other users or the environment are going to be 
seriously affected by the change because return flows and 
effects of deep percolation are accounted for . Thus, this is a 
Pareto-efficient improvement .
There are also other techniques that can conserve water 
without affecting historic return flows . These techniques 
include rotational fallowing, deficit irrigation, or crop 
switching . These techniques entail a lower up-front cost so 
they will be more attractive to farmers . Some of the tech-
niques may reduce productivity, but lower profits may be 
compensated by the lease or sale of the water conserved .77 
Calculating the amount actually conserved would be easier 
if consumption is adopted as one of the measures of the 
water right .
C. Unintended Benefits: Market Booster
1. The Indirect Definition of Rights by the 
No-Injury Rule
Prior appropriation rights are transferable . But there is a 
limit: the no-injury rule . This rule also applies when there 
are changes in water rights even if the right holder remains 
the same .78 Water transactions cannot be carried out if they 
injure third parties, be they other users or the environ-
ment .79 Transactions change the status quo . If A—a down-
stream user—transfers water to B—an upstream one—at 
76 . Telephone Interview with Karl Nyquist, Vice President, C&A Companies 
(July 13, 2015) .
77 . For a discussion of those techniques and the necessary steps to ensure that 
conserved water is easily tradable, see Mark Squillace & Anthony McLeod, 
Marketing Conserved Water (working paper, on file with the author) .
78 . See supra Section II .D .
79 . The no-injury rule is followed by all states in the western United States . 
Thompson et al ., supra note 28, at 307 .
a minimum, there will be less water flowing between A 
and B, and other users who were using part of that water or 
needed more power to divert water out of the stream may 
be harmed . If B ends up consuming more than A used to, 
users downstream of A may also be harmed . The transfer 
may not make economic sense . It is clear that B values the 
water more than A, but if A used to return a certain amount 
of water to the river that was used over and over again, and 
now B does not return the same amount, we cannot be sure 
that the transfer is beneficial . This is so because the value of 
that water to A is lower than the total value of that water to 
A and the other users jointly .
A system to handle those externalities could rely on pri-
vate bargaining between the parties A and B and the other 
users affected, but transaction costs will be too high and 
government or private nongovernmental organizations, if 
there are instream flow rights defined, would have to repre-
sent the environment . Instead, the system in place requires 
users to seek approval before the water agencies when enter-
ing into water transactions . Those agencies enforce the no-
injury rule . The approval procedure generates transaction 
costs that may deter water transfers .
To a great extent, the no-injury rule80 results in limiting 
transfers to the amount consumed; a farmer will not be 
able to transfer the amount she returned to the river . The 
amount returned to the river may have been used by other 
farmers, given that agencies have overallocated streams 
assuming that farmers do not use all their paper rights .81 
Those other users may be harmed if the transaction takes 
place . Further, streamflows will be altered, which may, in 
many circumstances, translate into harm for the ecosystem . 
Oregon, for example, allows farmers to only transfer the 
consumptive use, but the Department of Water Resources 
interprets this limit generously and normally grants the 
consumptive use of the most water-consuming crop in the 
area where the seller or lessor of the water right is .
It seems inconsistent that a farmer is allowed to use her 
water right fully by changing her crop or her irrigation 
method, even if other users are harmed, but she cannot sell 
the whole amount of water she is entitled to,82 reinforcing 
the idea that usufructuary83 water rights do not fit a con-
cept of property shaped for land .84 In sum, the no-injury 
80 . Meyers & Richard Posner propose to minimize the costs arising from 
the cumbersome administrative review procedure related to de minimis 
externalities . It consists in adopting “substantial injury” or “no unreasonable 
effect” as a standard for review, instead of “no injury .” Charles J . Meyers & 
Richard A . Posner, Toward an Improved Market in Water Resources 
27 (National Water Commission 1971) . A standard similar to “substantial 
injury” is applied regarding the effects on the environment: transfers 
unreasonably affecting fish, wildlife, or other beneficial instream uses are 
not authorized in California . Cal . Water Code §§1725 and 1735 .
81 . Getches, supra note 35, at 155 . See also Oregon Hearing on S . 869, 
cited in Koehl, supra note 46, at 1160 . An additional reason for the 
overappropriation is that some junior users may know that they can only 
exercise a right in particularly wet years .
82 . Mark Squillace, The Water Marketing Solution, 42 ELR 10800, 10805 (Sept . 
2012) .
83 . Conversation with Teri Hranac from Oregon Water Resources Department 
(July 11, 2015) .
84 . Sandra B . Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 Ala . 
L . Rev . 679 (2008) .
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rule indirectly defines the volume that water rights entitle 
their holder to by allowing only the amount consumed 
to be sold or leased .85 In addition, some states, like Wyo-
ming, specifically limit the amount to be transferred to the 
amount effectively consumed .86 In practice, there might 
be situations where the amount that can be transferred is 
even lower than the amount historically consumed by the 
farmer, where there is a change in the place of use and users 
located between the seller and the buyer would have the 
water available to them reduced . The proposal of defining 
rights according to the consumptive use will give coher-
ence to the dichotomy as to how the volume of the right 
is defined depending on which stick in the bundle a right 
holder is trying to exercise: use or transfer .
2. Fewer Potential Externalities: 
Streamlined Authorization Procedure
Defining rights according to consumptive use for the pur-
poses of water markets only is not a new idea . This Article 
has proposed to adopt consumption as the measure of the 
right for all purposes, but consumption has already been 
adopted by some conservation regulations, as the previous 
section shows, or advanced by some scholars as a variable 
defining water rights when it comes to water transactions .87
California’s regulation of water transactions differenti-
ates between short-term transfers (one-year maximum) 
of consumed water and other transfers . Short-term trans-
fers of post-1914 prior appropriation rights of consumed 
water are subject to a more streamlined review procedure .88 
“Consumptively used” water includes “water which has 
been consumed through use by evapotranspiration, has 
percolated underground, or has been otherwise removed 
from use in the downstream water supply as a result of 
direct diversion .”89
This definition gives security to downstream users of the 
stream because the return flow is not included . Conversely, 
in the regulation of long-term transfers, there is no limit as 
to the origin of the water that can be transferred . The dif-
ference is reflected in the thoroughness of the review pro-
85 . Squillace, supra note 82, at 10804 .
86 . Wyoming law states:
The change in use, or change in place of use, may be allowed, 
provided that the quantity of water transferred by the granting 
of the petition shall not exceed the amount of water historically 
diverted under the existing use, nor exceed the historic rate of di-
version under the existing use, nor increase the historic amount 
consumptively used under the existing use, nor decrease the his-
toric amount of return flow, nor in any manner injure other exist-
ing lawful appropriators .
 Wyo . Stat . §41-3-104 (LexisNexis 2014) .
87 . See Squillace, supra note 82 . See also Ronald N . Johnson et al ., The Definition 
of a Surface Water Right and Transferability, 24 J .L . & Econ . 273 (1981) . For 
an analysis of the market inefficiencies arising from the current definition 
of prior appropriation rights according to the amount diverted, see H . 
Stuart Burness & James P . Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic 
Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J .L . & Econ . 111 (1980) .
88 . Cal . Water Code §1725 (temporary change in the right) .
89 . Cal . Water Code §§1745 .10, 1745 .11 . The review procedure for long-
term transfers is much less spelled out in the regulation . Transactions cannot 
substantially injure other users or unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other 
instream beneficial uses . Cal . Water Code §1736 .
cess, which is more expedited for short-term transfers . The 
time frame to carry out the review of short-term transfers 
is tight . The investigation has to start within 10 days of 
the receipt of the petition, and the Board has, on a normal 
basis, 35 days after that to render the decision .90 The reason 
behind this less-demanding review procedure is that exter-
nalities in short-term transfers are not only short-lived, 
but also minimized .91 The procedure can be streamlined 
because the transactions taking place under this frame-
work are likely to produce fewer externalities, as no more 
water is taken from the river than before .
Mark Squillace proposes to define rights both in terms 
of the amounts diverted and consumed for purposes of 
water transactions—but for all water transactions, not just 
for short-term ones . But such a definition by itself cannot 
make transfers simpler, as California’s short-term transfers 
show, unless the no-injury rule is relaxed . He acknowl-
edges that the high transaction costs imposed today by the 
no-injury rule to which water transfers are subject make 
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for water markets 
to fulfill the role in allocating water flexibly as increasing 
scarcity challenges require .92 If only the amount consumed 
will be transferable, further streamlining of the review 
procedure would be in order for all types of transactions 
because the no-injury rule will have a lesser role to play . 
Squillace proposes to relax the no-injury rule and consid-
ers that a minimal or nonexistent review of transfers of the 
90 . Barton Thompson Jr ., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 
81 Cal . L . Rev . 671, 705 (1993) (Thompson gives some comparative 
data on the duration of approval procedures in many states: “any transfer 
applications take only a month or two to resolve, but the average 
processing time appears to range from six months to one and one-half 
years (with controversial transfers occasionally taking up to several years) .” 
His data relies on a 1990 study by Robert S . Robinson & Lawrence J . 
MacDonnell, 2 The Water Transfer Process as a Management 
Option for Meeting Changing Water Demands 47 (Natural Resource 
Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law 1990)) . This can be 
conceptualized as an embellished no-injury rule . Jedidiah Brewer et al ., Law 
and the New Institutional Economics: Water Markets and Legal Change in 
California, 1987-2005, 26 Wash . U . J .L . & Pol’y 183, 195 (2008) .
  The review procedure imposes large transaction costs, which may 
discourage some transactions . Transaction costs arising from these review 
procedures are always negatively regarded as a waste of money . But, as Bonnie 
Colby suggests, perhaps they should not be considered so negative, since 
in the absence of a perfect definition of property rights with the resulting 
complete internalization of third-party effects, transaction costs could be a 
useful tool to ensure that transactions that provide net benefits go forward . 
According to Colby, often there are no perfect mechanisms to compensate 
for these environmental externalities in western U .S . states because standing 
might be controversial and only transactions causing outrageous effects are 
barred . Thus, transaction costs arising from the review procedure might be 
a good substitute for the lack of perfect compensation . If a transferee’s ideal 
benefit function should be benefits from the new water bought minus price 
and costs imposed on third parties and the environment, in the absence 
of a compensation mechanism but with a lengthy review procedure, the 
formula would substitute the external costs compensation by a mix of 
compensation to other right holders and the “policy-induced transactions 
costs .” The author argues that these costs are not dollars burned, but a 
redistribution of dollars from the applicants to the agents intervening in 
the transaction review process (agencies, lawyers, or consultants) . Bonnie G . 
Colby, Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72 Am . J . 
Agric . Econ . 1184 (1990) .
91 . Another important reduction of transaction costs in these short-term 
transfers in California occurs because they are not subject to the California 
Environmental Quality Act .
92 . Squillace, supra note 82 .
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consumptive amount would accept certain negative effects 
on third parties . In fact, he argues that prior appropriation 
law already tolerates some negative effects on other users 
when farmers change crops or irrigation systems .93
The proposal set forth in this Article will define the 
consumptive amount a user is entitled to for all pur-
poses: use in her own land or transfer . For transactions, 
a lessened review procedure in line with Squillace needs 
to accompany the change . The fact that the volume 
consumed is already defined should make transactions 
even easier because parties will not need to bring evi-
dence of the amount historically consumed during the 
review of transactions .
Australia implemented a regulatory regime that proves 
that making rights more fungible increases water market 
activity . Some Australian states—Queensland, New South 
Wales, Victoria, and South Australia—unbundled their 
water rights . Previously, all the sticks were amalgamated in 
a single water license . After the reform, which was aimed 
at improving water management and enhancing water 
transfers, the licenses were divided into as many as four 
different rights . A water right holder had four sticks: the 
access entitlement, the water allocation, the water resource 
work approval, and the site use, which allows water to be 
used in a particular location .94 Water allocations embody 
the right to withdraw a certain amount of water in a par-
ticular season, and are transferable . They are recorded in 
water accounts, a system similar to a bank account, which 
makes them even easier to transfer . This sharper definition 
of water rights increased the activity in the water market 
because the rights were more fungible,95 allowing for a 
more streamlined transaction approval procedure, and this 
contributed to better water management .96
By changing the definition of water rights, adopting 
consumption as one of the variables defining the volume, 
and making transactions of consumed water easier, this 
Article’s proposal is more likely to achieve an efficient allo-
cation of water than the current definition can . If transac-
tions are easier, a farmer who wants to shift to drip irrigation 
but who needs to consume more water to do so profitably 
may resort to the market to buy the extra water she needs . 
93 . Id . at 10805 .
94 . These first two components of the right are personal property, not 
appurtenant to land . Such a definition increases the fungibility of water 
rights in a similar way as using consumptive use as the measure of the 
transferable right . The access entitlement “provides an ongoing right to 
a specified share of water available for allocation from a prescribed water 
resource .” The water allocation is “the right to take a specific volume of 
water for a given period of time, not exceeding 12 months, based on the 
volume of water available for allocation in that period .” Each share translates 
into a certain water allocation .
95 . Lack of fungibility is a problem in water rights . Squillace, supra note 82, at 
10804 . Another example of fungibility resulting in increased water market 
activity is the Colorado-Big Thompson Project . See Jedidiah Brewer et 
al ., Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and Contractual 
Forms 11, 33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ . Research, Working Paper No . 130002, 
2007), http://www .icer .it/docs/wp2007/ICERwp30-07 .pdf .
96 . Mike Young, The Role of the Unbundling Water Rights in 
Australia’s Southern Connected Murray Darling Basin (2011), 
available at http://www .feem-project .net/epiwater/docs/d32-d6-1/CS23_
Australia .pdf .
It may be argued that the same could happen today if the 
increase in consumption harms a junior whose use is more 
valuable: the said junior could buy out the senior . The only 
difference would be distributional consequences, which 
may not matter in terms of efficiency .97 Thus, the current 
system may not need to be amended .
Beyond fairness arguments, which favor the proposal 
put forward here, current regulation of water transactions 
imposes higher transaction costs than the proposal in this 
Article . Accordingly, fewer transactions will happen even 
in situations where the junior user values the water more 
than the senior consuming more as a result of a change in 
the irrigation method . Further, under current regulation, 
if instream flows are not defined, government or private 
parties may need to buy out the senior willing to increase 
her consumption . This will not be necessary under the pro-
posal set forth because changes in irrigation methods or 
other technically efficient measures adopted by the farmer 
will not translate into diminished streamflows .
The Lower Arkansas River Basin, particularly the 
2015 Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District 
(LAVWCD) Plan Request, shows that this proposal may 
also enhance markets . It does so by reducing transac-
tion costs because it matches the current definition of the 
amount transferable in practice . But it also enhances mar-
kets by motivating farmers to resort to the market when 
they want to increase their consumption, making sure that 
water is put to the most valuable use . In the LAVWCD, 
several farmers installed center pivot systems . Those sys-
tems consume more than traditional irrigation methods . 
The regulations in the Lower Arkansas River Basin in Col-
orado require the right holders to make up for the increase 
in consumption in order to approve the change in irrigation 
method . The district in this example used several sources 
to make up for the change in return flows, including water 
leases from Pueblo . The LAVWCD has a long-term con-
tract with Pueblo Board of Water Works to provide up to 
500 ac-ft per year of fully consumable supplies to meet the 
obligations imposed by the regulations implementing the 
Arkansas River Compact .
D. Implementation
1. Mechanisms of Change
Western states have migrated to statutory prior appropri-
ation systems . The agencies granting and enforcing those 
permits could review the existing permits and incorpo-
rate consumption volume as an additional variable in 
their definition . Doing so would be similar to a state 
agency-initiated general adjudication where the burden 
of proof is arguably on the agency . General adjudications 
of streams for which rights need to be quantified are a 
97 . Ronald H . Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J .L . & Econ . 1, 44 (1960); 
C . Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorem and Western U.S. Appropriative Water 
Rights, 45 Nat . Res . J . 169 (2005) .
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situation where consumptive use as a variable defining 
the right could be incorporated .98
Alternatively, the regulation for changes in water rights 
could include a provision establishing that a change in the 
amount consumed would require approval . Such a provi-
sion would imply that the consumptive value would only 
kick in whenever the farmer wants to change her current 
practices . This provision would be broader than a provi-
sion establishing that changes in the irrigation method and 
crop need to be approved by the water agency . If only these 
two types of potential changes are included, there might be 
some increases in consumption that may escape the need 
for approval, such as planting more intensively than before . 
These individual adjudications may generate many costs to 
the individual farmers, and if they do not comply with the 
regulations, enforcement may be very difficult because, for 
example, there might be no records available to the agency 
of which crop the farmer was growing before . If this route 
is chosen, further reporting obligations should be imposed 
on farmers . Whether using this procedure or a more gen-
eral regulation applying to all rights, state water agencies, 
probably collaborating with their agricultural agencies, 
should establish an agricultural register that contains 
detailed information about which crop is grown on each 
acre of agricultural land .99
In fact, imposing the variable of consumption, while 
maintaining the diversion amount, has exactly the same 
effect as requiring farmers to apply for changes in their 
rights when consumption changes, because it allows farm-
ers to continue with their current practices . So, the choice 
of one over another will depend on who should bear the 
costs: individuals or the agency . The agency has experts at 
its beck and call; hence, it has an advantage . Either the gen-
eral procedure or an individual adjudication of changes in 
water rights where the burden of proof is placed primarily 
on the agency builds on this expertise of the agency . The 
general procedure will obviously be more lengthy . If that 
is the strategy chosen, while it is being implemented, the 
cutoff date must be set to avoid opportunistic changes in 
crops or irrigation methods, or the time frame established 
to calculate average consumption must aim at reducing 
moral hazard .
For new rights, the agency may decide to grant permits 
fixing diversion and consumption according to the most 
efficient irrigation technology . The most efficient irriga-
tion technology socially, not only individually, may be drip 
because pollution is reduced, yield increases, and current 
rights are not affected . Farmers may or may not adopt 
the technology used to calculate irrigation needs . Perhaps 
changing the crop, leveling the fields, and optimizing irri-
98 . Neuman, supra note 37, at 979 (emphasizing the role that general stream 
adjudications may have in redefining beneficial use) .
99 . The USDA Census of Agriculture and its publicly available maps are a step in 
this direction and may be helpful to state agencies (see http://www .agcensus .
usda .gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Ag_Atlas_Maps/), but they 
neither amount to a Register nor contain individualized information per 
plot of land .
gation scheduling can spare them the investment while still 
complying with the limit set forth in the new permit .
Other systems, like riparian states, could adopt con-
sumption as a potential measure of the right . Permits 
granted in regulated riparianism systems100 are very similar 
in nature to statutory prior appropriation permit systems 
regarding the control over the water right by the agencies 
granting them . In fact, the Regulated Riparian Model 
Water Code opens the door to adopting consumption 
as the measure; it states among the elements of the per-
mit “the amount of return flow, if any, required and any 
required place of discharge .”101 However, among regulated 
riparianism states, diversion or withdrawal is still the norm 
even if, for example, Wisconsin requires the application to 
include: “The estimated average annual and monthly vol-
umes and rates of water loss .”102
Colorado is implementing a system similar to the one 
proposed in the Arkansas River Basin . The Rules Govern-
ing Improvements to Surface Irrigation Systems in the 
Arkansas River Basin in Colorado were proposed by the 
state engineer and approved by the water court in 2009 .103 
Those rules aim to comply with the Arkansas River Com-
pact, which is a “depletion” compact; Colorado cannot 
consume more water than it used to because the Compact 
grants Kansas undiminished flows .104
According to the Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. 
Colorado, Colorado’s groundwater regulation violated the 
Compact because the increasing number of wells impacted 
the amount of water flowing down to Kansas . The state 
engineer considered that improvement in irrigation meth-
ods could have the same effects, and the aforementioned 
rules require users to apply before the state engineer when-
ever they are changing their irrigation system . There is no 
control when farmers change the type of crops . Farmers 
challenged the rules before a water court, but they were 
100 . “Regulated riparianism” is a term coined by and encapsulated in the 
water right permit systems adopted by eastern U .S . states to deal with 
the shortcomings of the common law of riparianism: among others, 
the preference for use on riparian lands, arising from reasonable use 
requirements, and the difficulty for cities in supplying their citizens . Joseph 
W . Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 Marq . 
L . Rev . 53 (2011) . See Robert W . Adler et al ., Modern Water Law 
231 (2013) . Shortages prompted states to also include conservation goals in 
their statutes . See Thompson et al ., supra note 28, at 136 .
101 . American Society of Civil Engineers, the Regulated Riparian Model 
Water Code: Final Report of the Water Laws Committee §7R-1-
01(g) (Joseph W . Dellapenna ed ., 2003) . See also id . §6R-2-01, when listing 
the requirements of an application: “e . the place of the proposed return flow 
of withdrawn water; f . an estimate of the projected overall consumptive use 
of water .”
102 . Wis . Stat . §§30 .18(6)(a), 281 .35(4), 281 .35(5)(a)(7) .
103 . In the Matter of the Proposed Compact Rules Governing Improvements to 
Surface Water Irrigation Systems in the Arkansas River Basin in Colorado, 
Case No . 09CW110, Water Division 2, col .
104 . Article IV-D of the Compact reads as follows:
D . This Compact is not intended to impede or prevent future ben-
eficial development of the Arkansas river basin in Colorado and 
Kansas by federal or state agencies, by private enterprise, or by com-
binations thereof, which may involve construction of dams, reser-
voirs and other works for the purposes of water utilization and con-
trol, as well as the improved or prolonged functioning of existing 
works: Provided, That the waters of the Arkansas river, as defined 
in Article III, shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or 
availability for use to the water users in Colorado .
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not frontally opposed to the regulations because they 
understood that Colorado was trying to avoid a new, costly 
interstate conflict with Kansas, and the Supreme Court in 
Kansas v. Colorado agreed with the special master that the 
Arkansas River Compact was a depletion compact .105 Thus, 
Colorado cannot increase consumption .
The office of the state engineer made an effort to reach 
out to stakeholders during the drafting process . One of the 
arguments employed by the officials was that the Irrigation 
Improvement Rules also protect users in Colorado from 
the increase in consumption by other users . Everyone is a 
junior and a senior to another water user . The proposal of 
adopting consumption as one of the definitional variables 
of the water right will face a similar political economy as 
Colorado faced . Farmers are likely to be the losers in any 
water law reform in the future . Urban water savings are not 
enough to mitigate the scarcity crisis . Agriculture must be 
the source of potential mitigation . The proposal put for-
ward in this Article is more palatable for the agricultural 
sector because it does not force farmers to incur any new 
investments, it allows farmers to keep their business as 
usual, and it does protect them from increases in consump-
tion by other farmers .
2. Measuring Is Possible
Diversion was administratively sound as a measure of the 
right in the absence of meters, but today we can rely on 
meters and models to measure consumption . It will take 
time to decouple different elements of water rights by 
including in the definition not only the flow withdrawn 
(cubic feet per second) as the measure, but also the volume 
consumed (acre-feet) . First, not all water rights are well-
recorded . But this problem is not particular to the amend-
ment to prior appropriation rights proposed here . Second, 
water right holders do not have meters measuring the 
diversion, much less their consumption .106 But they could 
have their consumption estimated by agricultural mod-
els that can approximate the amount depleted given the 
type of soil, the crop selected, and the irrigation method . 
These models, like those used in technical studies cited in 
this Article, could only provide estimates, yet they will be 
cheaper than relying on expert testimony in an adversarial 
process, where determinations of historical use for the pur-
poses of water transfers have proven to be very costly .
It must be acknowledged, however, that courts in the 
past have been reluctant to accept evidence from models or 
experiments, instead of actual practices .107 But since there 
is extensive experience in the use of sprinklers and drip irri-
gation, the agencies could base their estimates on actual 
data, not mere assumptions . In addition, models such as 
the Penman-Monteith, recommended by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, have been 
105 . 514 U .S . 673, 675, 115 S . Ct . 1733, 1736, 131 L . Ed . 2d 759, 767 (1995) .
106 . Neuman, supra note 37, at 985 .
107 . United States v . Alpine Land & Reservoir Co ., 697 F .2d 851 (9th Cir . 
1983) . See also In re SBA Case No . 39576 (Idaho 1997) (commenting in 
special master report on the engineering model used by Idaho) .
used to calculate ET for a long time by water agencies,108 
even in the context of water markets .109
The Compact Rules Governing Improvements to 
Surface Water Irrigation Systems in the Arkansas River 
Basin in Colorado use the Irrigation System Analysis 
Model (ISAM) to evaluate the changes brought about by 
the change in irrigation methods .110 It helps reduce costs 
because each user will not need to hire an engineer to 
do a study . There are two parts to the model . One estab-
lishes the baseline and makes a threshold determination of 
whether changes in irrigation method will increase con-
sumption by comparing the water balance with and with-
out the improvement during the period 1997-2006 . This is 
a representative period of diverse water supply conditions .
The second part is a model that helps the farmer to 
implement the changes in the upcoming year by calculat-
ing her historical consumption in a year similar to what the 
upcoming one is expected to be . This model requires very 
little information from the farmers . They need to provide 
only “the number of acres irrigated by each type of system; 
any change in acreage due to the improvement  .   .   .; the 
surface water right or rights on that acreage (or the number 
of ditch shares, if applicable); and whether there is supple-
mental irrigation from a well .”
Models, though technically complex, have been a tool 
welcomed by the farm sector in Colorado . Farmers have 
welcomed the ISAM model given the office of the state 
engineer’s willingness to work on updates if new informa-
tion suggests that the model is too stringent . Even if the 
route taken is a case-by-case adjudication when a farmer 
wants to introduce a change in her water right, a model 
to be applied across the board should be approved before-
hand, with an appropriate notice-and-comment period .
E. Takings Challenges
Limiting the amount that a holder of a prior appropriation 
right can consume to the amount consumed on average 
over the past five years might raise takings challenges when 
those limitations are imposed on existing rights . General 
stream adjudications do not amount to a taking even when 
resulting in adverse effects on the rights . However, water 
agencies’ regulations restricting existing rights, be they 
common-law or permit-based prior appropriation rights, 
are likely to be challenged on takings grounds . Given that 
such regulations will be state regulations, the private right 
holder may assert her claim based on the state and federal 
constitution . The analysis here focuses on the latter .
The first step in analyzing whether there has been a tak-
ing is to ask whether water rights are property protected 
by the Fifth Amendment . Landmark judicial decisions on 
108 . California Department of Water Resources, Agricultural Water Use Models, 
http://www .water .ca .gov/landwateruse/models .cfm (last visited Oct . 12, 
2016) .
109 . Lana Jones & Bonnie G . Colby, Measuring, Monitoring, and 
Enforcing Temporary Water Transfers: Considerations, Case 
Examples, Innovations, and Costs (2012) .
110 . Rule 9 .B .i .
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water rights takings have not spent much time discussing 
the nature of the water rights; they have assumed they 
were protected . Some commentators argue that water 
rights are not property with respect to takings, only with 
respect to protection under the Due Process Clause given 
their public property nature and how subject to the con-
trol of government they are .111 But those commentators 
are in the minority .112
Assuming that water rights are protected, the second 
step of the analysis is to assess whether we are facing a cat-
egorical or per se taking, or one that requires a balancing 
test . There are two types of categorical takings: physical 
and those without physical invasion but where the regula-
tion wipes out any economic value the right might have .
Regarding water, the doctrine is muddy . In Tulare Lake 
Basin Water Storage District v. United States,113 the court 
stated that a reduction in the amount of water available for 
pumping as a result of complying with the ESA constituted 
a physical taking, even though the National Marine Fish-
eries Service and the U .S . Fish and Wildlife Service did not 
take possession of the water but mandated the reduction .114 
Tulare is still an exception, being often rejected by subse-
quent decisions .115 If a court were to follow the Tulare rea-
soning, then the redefinition of rights proposed here may 
amount to a physical taking,116 and thus require compen-
sation because there will not be a difference between the 
government actually taking the water and not allowing the 
farmer to consume it .
The second type of categorical takings—elimination of 
all economic value—arising from the decision in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council,117 does not fit the situation 
at hand, where the amount of water the farmer can con-
sume is limited to the amount consumed on average for the 
period chosen . In the proposal put forward by this Article, 
the farmer could keep her business as usual; she may keep 
diverting the same amount if she returns the same amount 
to the river in the form of return flow . She may also divert 
only the amount to be consumed if she has installed some 
111 . Zellmer & Harder, supra note 84 .
112 . Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 Wash . L . Rev . 253, 275 (2013) .
113 . 49 Fed . Cl . 313, 31 ELR 20648 (2001) . See Melinda Harm Benson, 
The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 32 Envtl . L . 551 (2002) .
114 . 32 Envtl . L . at 555 . In the Tulare case, the plaintiffs were contractors 
receiving water from the State Water Project . As Benson points out, the 
court did not discuss at length whether those rights were interests protected 
under the Fifth Amendment . Regulations in other fields have also been 
considered physical takings . Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U .S . 
825, 17 ELR 20918 (1987), where a landowner was required to provide an 
easement to receive a building permit, required an essential nexus between 
the burden imposed by the regulated activity and the restriction . In this 
case, increasing consumption imposes externalities on other users and 
the public . Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U .S . 374, 24 ELR 21083 (1994), 
further refined the nexus requiring the connection to be proportionate . 
If historical consumption is adopted as a new limit defining water rights, 
there is no burden imposed on the holder of a water right because she can 
keep irrigating, and the fact that she cannot increase her consumptions is 
not disproportionate .
115 . Owen, supra note 112, at 273 .
116 . Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as “Property” Through Takings 
Litigation: Is There a Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 Envtl . L . 
115, 122 (2012) .
117 . 505 U .S . 1003, 22 ELR 21104 (1992) .
irrigation method, such as trickle irrigation, which does not 
produce return flow . This means that the farmer will not 
see her potential economic benefits reduced with respect to 
the status quo . Lucas’ categorical regulatory taking requires 
the deprivation of all economic use of the right, in that case 
the land, which is not what limiting the amount of water 
consumed to the historical average entails .
Once the possibility of categorical taking is excluded, 
the third step is to determine whether there has been a 
taking under the balancing doctrine resulting from Penn 
Central . If the court undertakes the regulatory takings 
analysis following Penn Central, the proposal advanced in 
this Article will most likely survive the challenge . This type 
of analysis is the most common in water rights takings cas-
es .118 The factors to be considered when analyzing whether 
the regulation has gone too far are:
(1) “the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant”;
(2) “particularly, the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions  .  .  .”; and
(3) “the character of the governmental action . A ‘tak-
ing’ may more readily be found when the interfer-
ence with property can be characterized as a physical 
invasion by government  .  .  ., than when interference 
arises from some public program adjusting the ben-
efits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good .”119
Here, the economic impact is nonexistent . First, it is 
important to note that water rights have been given for 
free .120 Second, they are already heavily regulated; for exam-
ple, they are subject to forfeiture if not used121 and there are 
no defeated expectations . Much as in Penn Central, where 
the station could continue to be used as it had been used in 
the past, in this case, if the farmer wants to keep using the 
water the way she has been using it for decades, she can . If 
instead she decides to install sprinklers or drip irrigation, 
she may incur investment expenses, but it can be a profit-
able investment even if she keeps consumption constant .
Alternatively, if a farmer has incurred the investment 
expenses for a more advanced irrigation system before 
the proposed definition is adopted and, thus, started con-
suming more than she used to, the consumption measure 
would take her most current consumption into account . 
So, if the farmer incurred those expenses calculating that 
she can consume as much as she diverted and invested 
more than she would have if she knew she would only be 
allowed to consume the amount she had been consuming, 
she would still be able to use the amount of water she was 
planning to because the investment is prior to the redefi-
nition . Much along the lines of Penn Central, where the 
118 . Owen, supra note 112, at 287 .
119 . Penn Cent . Transp . Co . v . New York City, 438 U .S . 104, 124, 8 ELR 20528 
(1978) .
120 . Squillace, supra note 82, at 10803 .
121 . Id .
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railroad company was not able to build a 50-story build-
ing, but still could build a less-tall building or sell its air 
rights,122 farmers who still choose to shift irrigation meth-
ods may be able not only to use the water consumed by the 
plants when using flood irrigation, but also the amount 
that evaporated .
Finally, consideration of the character of the government 
action may allow the public trust doctrine to play a role . As 
the Mono Lake decision stated in 1983, water is protected 
under the public trust doctrine .123 Accordingly, if the gov-
ernment is acting as the trustee for the public in order to 
make sure water is managed in the most beneficial way pos-
sible for society by regulating existing water rights, such a 
regulation should not be considered a taking .124 In this case, 
the government wants to protect not only other users who 
are relying on the water returned by the farmers, but also 
instream flow, which would be diminished if the defini-
tion of prior appropriation rights remains unchanged and 
the adoption of innovative irrigation systems is encouraged . 
Beyond the fairness of water allocation, without the redefi-
nition proposed in this Article, a change in irrigation meth-
ods is not likely to bring about the socially efficient solution .
Further, arguments have been made that the takings 
doctrine should not be an obstacle to changes in water law 
if the changes reduce waste . It could be said that to some 
extent the proposal of defining rights according to the vol-
ume consumed, instead of just the volume diverted, is a 
way to prevent users from profiting from their waste . Some 
farmers use antiquated irrigation methods and do not try 
to adopt simple measures to save water like watching care-
fully the times when they irrigate . Today, flood irrigation, 
still the main type of irrigation used in the United States, 
could be considered archaic . Technology has advanced, 
and farmers have not always caught up .
The fact that farmers’ practices have lagged behind 
provides one further reason this proposal should survive 
the takings challenge . Stephen Shupe, in his blueprint for 
change in western water law, reads the Oregon Supreme 
Court decision Hough v. Porter125 as saying that the volume 
of the water right may change as technology advances .126 
The definition of property rights evolves as technology 
changes,127 and water rights should be no different . While 
Shupe asks for a more current interpretation of waste 
122 . Calvert G . Chipchase, From Grand Central to the Sierras: What Do We Do 
With Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 Va . 
Envtl . L .J . 43, 51 (2004) .
123 . National Audubon Society v . Superior Court, 33 Cal . 3d 419, 13 ELR 
10272 (Cal . 1983) (commonly known as the “Mono Lake” case) .
124 . Owen, supra note 112, at 296 (analyzing natural rights property theories 
and their implications for takings) .
125 . 51 Or . 318, 95 P . 732, modified, 51 Or . 318, 420, 98 P . 1083, 1102 (1908), 
aff’d on rehearing, 51 Or . 318, 102 P . 728 (1909) .
126 . Shupe, supra note 70, at 496:
This holding recognizes that while appropriators have a vested 
right to irrigate their land, the volume of water associated with 
this right may change as technology develops . With the advent 
of more efficient techniques, the excess water demands of the old 
systems are “declared to be wasteful and have been only a privilege 
and not a right .”
127 . Gary D . Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights 16 (1989) .
doctrines and better enforcement,128 this Article proposes 
introducing another dimension to the definition of prop-
erty rights .
F. Alternatives to the Adoption of Consumption
Instead of reforming prior appropriation to include an 
additional variable to the definition, as this Article pro-
poses, there are other amendments that could partially 
address the same issues . The first variation would be to 
require approval of any change in irrigation methods . The 
provisions regulating the approval of changes in the place 
of use or type of use are already in place . If a change in the 
method of irrigation were to be included, then it would 
be subject to the no-injury rule . In this case, consumption 
will only enter into the picture once a change in irrigation 
method triggers it . Administrative costs would be lower, 
but the risk of moral hazard is greater because unless the 
consumption amount is fixed for everyone at the same 
time, farmers would have an incentive to increase con-
sumption using other methods not to be constrained when 
in the future they change irrigation methods .
This proposal is similar to the requirements established 
in the Lower Arkansas Valley, where a farmer cannot 
increase the amount she has been consuming . If, instead, 
only a no-injury rule were in place, a farmer could increase 
the amount consumed if there were no negative effects 
for the environment or for other users . The Lower Arkan-
sas framework also mitigates moral hazard because the 
amount consumed is not allowed to change from historical 
consumption levels . The main problem of subjecting the 
change of irrigation method to the regulation of change 
in water rights, or adopting the approach of the Lower 
Arkansas Basin, is that not all production changes aimed 
at efficiency and resulting in changes in consumption are 
shifts in irrigation methods . The list of triggers of changes 
in water rights provisions could be endless .
A second option would be to enforce the prohibition 
against waste, reducing the amount available for each 
farmer . If current flooding practices are not considered 
socially acceptable, the permits could be reduced . How-
ever, it is unclear how the amount of water awarded to a 
right holder once waste is discounted would be calculated 
or whether a particular technology would be imposed . In 
any case, if provisions against waste are strengthened and 
rely on innovative technologies, they must take into con-
sideration the impact on consumption given the reliance 
of other users and the dependence of the environment on 
return flows . The effects would be very similar to the ones 
proposed in this Article . But there are two main differ-
ences . First, using anti-waste provisions implies that the 
agricultural sector would be blamed and that sector may be 
less willing to accept such an enforcement policy . Second, 
it would also be less welcome by private parties because 
they would not be allowed to continue with their current 
128 . Shupe, supra note 70 .
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practices . They will be required to improve the conveyance 
system or the irrigation method .
The third alternative implies a more acute departure 
from the current system: bill farmers for the amount of 
water they consume, not the amount they divert . Harm to 
other users may still exist, but a pricing mechanism could 
be envisioned that would achieve an efficient solution . 
Such a scheme may prove unfeasible because water pricing 
is a thorny issue . A pricing scheme may be more difficult 
to implement than the proposal presented in this section 
for reasons of political economy . In addition, this proposal 
would require calculating current consumption and, thus, 
it would be more costly to administer than adopting con-
sumption as one of the variables defining prior appropria-
tion rights .
The fourth alternative is aimed at achieving the best 
allocation possible, not at amending the current system 
per se . There could be a system where instream flows 
are defined as reserved water and all the water over that 
amount is allocated using rights defined according to 
diversion with or without a no-injury rule . In such a hypo-
thetical ideal world, parties could negotiate over the exter-
nalities imposed and water should end up in the fields of 
those who value it the most . Under a no-injury rule, the 
farmer who wants to increase his consumption would pay 
to compensate those harmed . Or, without a no-injury rule, 
those harmed would pay the farmer not to increase con-
sumption if they value water more than he did . However, 
a river is not the world of blackboard economics . A change 
in a water right will affect a large number of users who may 
not find it beneficial to bargain with the right holder who, 
thus, will not internalize the social cost of his action .
The proposal advanced in this Article assumes that con-
sumption will fill the meaning of beneficial use when it 
comes to the volume, and the establishment and adminis-
tration of those limits will be in the hands of the water agen-
cies as it is today . Instead of relying on bargaining between 
private parties, a liability system could also be enforced by 
a water agency . The agency would make a farmer pay if she 
exceeds her consumption limit . It may be difficult to iden-
tify who is consuming more, but it would be possible to 
measure the reduction in stream flow accounting for natu-
ral variances . If that is the case, a system where every user is 
liable for the difference between the actual amount and the 
amount that should be flowing in the stream should pro-
vide the correct incentives to ensure that the user does not 
increase her consumption .129 However, this framework is 
a departure from the traditional enforcement mechanisms 
in water law that have been reactive; enforcement actions 
are undertaken if another user or someone representing the 
environment files a complaint because she or the ecosystem 
is being affected .
129 . This idea was put forward by Robert D . Cooter & Ariel Porat, Total Liability 
for Excessive Harm, in Getting Incentives Right 74-91 (2014) . The 
authors discuss the pollution of a river, which is a case analogous to the one 
presented here . Id . at 86 .
This Article’s proposal to add consumptive volume to 
the definition of water rights is an incremental improve-
ment of the current system of prior appropriation . It would 
not require farmers to undergo any change in their produc-
tion methods . Thus, there should not be a farming-sector 
upheaval against it . Adopting consumption as part of the 
definition tackles not only a change in irrigation methods, 
but also any change in agricultural production that results 
in increased consumption . Such an amendment may harm 
some farmers, but would also protect junior right holders 
and prevent socially undesirable behavior . In addition, once 
a model to calculate consumption is adopted, administer-
ing the system would be less daunting . In Colorado, the 
model used in the Lower Arkansas Basin has been widely 
accepted . By settling the amount of water a user is entitled 
to as the average of water consumed during the past five 
years, the race to consumption will be prevented .
IV. Conclusion
Water is getting scarcer in the western United States and 
elsewhere . The doctrine of prior appropriation, which regu-
lates water allocation in that region, does not live up to 
current challenges . Water is primarily allocated to the agri-
cultural sector, which still uses archaic irrigation methods 
and incentivizes the planting of water-intensive crops . Time 
and time again, farmers are blamed for the water crisis or 
targeted as the source of the remedy . Prior appropriation 
is a doctrine “designed to allow as many people to use as 
much water as possible .”130 But the provisions against waste 
have not had teeth . Those farmers who are using purport-
edly wasteful practices are not considered to be in violation 
of the law .
Policymakers, media, and scholars claim that the agri-
cultural sector should install efficient irrigation systems, 
such as sprinklers or drip irrigation, either as part of a more 
thorough enforcement of anti-waste provisions or with a 
soft-law approach . These irrigation systems produce more 
crop per drop . However, most proposals to modernize irri-
gation fail to understand that those technically efficient 
irrigation systems may reduce the amount withdrawn from 
the field, but not the overall amount consumed . Those sys-
tems may be more efficient and less wasteful than flood 
or furrow irrigation at the individual level, but not in the 
aggregate . Drip irrigation or sprinklers may increase con-
sumption in water-short scenarios . Given how overallo-
cated rivers are, the increase in consumption by one user 
translates into others not being able to access that water . 
The situation after the change is not only unfair because 
users may have been relying on that water for decades, but 
may also be inefficient because we cannot be sure that the 
new allocation maximizes the value of water .
The translation between technological efficiency at the 
field level and efficiency of the overall water allocation is 
not automatic, and illustrates another instance where regu-
lation borrowing technical terms has had unintended con-
130 . Tarlock, supra note 3, at 152 .
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sequences . Just as energy regulations are now taking into 
account the rebound effect, it is time for water regulations 
to do so too .
Even though some conservation statutes only consider 
savings arising from changes in irrigation when they effec-
tively reduce the amount consumed, prior appropriation 
has lagged behind . Under prior appropriation, there are 
no barriers to a farmer increasing the total amount she 
consumes when she changes the irrigation method or the 
crop even if other users or the environment are harmed . 
To achieve the conservation goal of making water avail-
able to other users, the volume of water rights needs to be 
defined not only according to the amount diverted, but 
also according to the amount consumed or depleted .
Incorporating this measure of consumption will not 
only ensure that changes in irrigation bring real water sav-
ings, but will also discourage the adoption of water-inten-
sive crops when, to do so profitably, water use would have 
to increase . This proposal also has ancillary benefits, thus, 
if adopted, water transactions would be subject to less scru-
tiny because fewer transaction costs are likely to arise . In 
fact, some authors have already proposed the adoption of 
consumption as the measure of water rights only regarding 
water transactions .
Prior appropriation is a doctrine that has evolved over 
time .131 The time has come for it to evolve again . The doc-
trine served us well in the past, but it is time to abandon 
the unfettered consumption paradigm for one that cen-
ters on efficient use, real conservation, and environmental 
concerns . The proposal of defining rights according to the 
volume historically consumed protects the status quo, but 
does not ossify it: it allows changes if these certainly bring 
social benefits .
Scrubbers were the solution to sulfur dioxide (SO2) pol-
lution adopted in the late 1970s Clean Air Act regulations . 
The reduction in emissions did not happen: midwestern 
power plants used high-sulfur coal .132 Scrubbers clean-
ing emissions from high-sulfur coal or drip irrigation in 
water-scarce overallocated aquifers are not solutions to acid 
rain or water scarcity . As the SO2 example and this Article 
show, technology can be a solution for our environmental 
problems, but only when accompanied by a proper regula-
tory framework .
131 . See A . Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 
41 Nat . Resources J . 769, 770 (2001) (“The distinguishing feature of 
prior appropriation is its continual evolution in response to a changing 
West . Because prior appropriation is grounded in both abstract 
principles of justice and hard experience, it has constantly had to adapt 
to changed conditions .”) .
132 . Bruce A . Ackerman & William T . Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air: Or 
How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out 
for High-Sulfur Coal Producers (1981) .
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